UNDP

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ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES:

UNDERSTANDING WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T AND WHY?

Lessons learned from the Asia-Pacific region

United Nations Development Programme

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Design and layout by Inis Communication

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Foreword

Despite the rapid economic growth in many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, poor governance and corruption remain a major challenge to human development by fuelling inequalities and undermining access to public services. We live in a region were inequalities are rising, where the largest number of people living in extreme poverty reside 743 million, and an almost equal number, or 700 million people live without electricity.

To curb corruption fourteen countries in the Asia-Pacific region have so far drafted an anti-corruption strategy that is a country's comprehensive anti-corruption policy document to coordinate national anti-corruption action. The development of anti-corruption strategies has often been driven by the efforts of States Parties to implement preventive measures under the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

The experience with anti-corruption strategies in the region has shown that strategies can be useful to articulate a long-term vision against corruption when developed in consultation with a wide range of stakeholders. At the United Nations Development Programme we emphasise the critical importance of engaging stakeholders beyond government against corruption – including youth, women, civil society as well as local communities – to change attitudes and make a real impact on people's daily lives.

However the lack of implementation and monitoring of anti-corruption strategies has raised questions on their effectiveness in practice. Recognising this caveat the United Nations Development Programme Bangkok Regional Hub (UNDP BRH), with the support of the Global Anti-corruption Initiative, as well as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have partnered in helping countries in the region in developing and monitoring strategies.

UNDP organised together with UNODC a regional conference hosted by the government of Malaysia with representatives from anti-corruption and national planning authorities in October 2013, which produced the *Kuala Lumpur Statement on Anti-Corruption Strategies*. Initially developed as guidance at the regional level for helping countries develop, implement and monitor strategies, the Kuala Lumpur Statement on Anti-Corruption Strategies has become part of the global normative framework against corruption. It was endorsed by the Conference of States Parties to the UN Convention against Corruption in November 2013 in Panama as part of Resolution 5/4: "Follow-up to the Marrakech declaration on the prevention of corruption".

This report reviews the experiences of fourteen countries in the region in designing, implementing, and monitoring anti-corruption strategies as well as the drivers for developing these strategies. It also calls for using evidence-based corruption measurement tools to develop and evaluate anti-corruption strategies effectively. This is essential to avoid that anti-corruption strategies remain mere declaration of intent and ensure that anti-corruption efforts are result-based.

We hope that the report will provide useful guidance for countries in the region in developing, implementing and evaluating anti-corruption strategies. UNDP remains committed to supporting partner governments in the region in this critical area for development.

Phil Matsheza
Democratic Governance Practice Leader
UNDP Bangkok Regional Hub

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List of Annexes

Acronyms Used

ACA	Anti-Corruption Agency
ACRC	Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission
ADB	Asian Development Bank
BRH	Bangkok Regional Hub
BPI	Bribe Payers' Index
CIAA	Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CPIB	Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
CVC	Country Vulnerability to Corruption
CoC	Control of Corruption
CSO	Civil Society Organization
GII	Global Integrity Index
GCB	Global Corruption Barometer
HDI	Human Development Index
HOOAC	High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption
ICAC	Independent Commission Against Corruption
KPK	Corruption Eradication Commission
MACC	Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission
MEC	Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NIS	National Integrity System
NKRA	National Key Result Areas
NPCC	National Program for Countering Corruption
NVC	National Vigilance Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAC	Public Affairs Centre
PAPI	Public Administration Performance Index
PCI	Provincial Competitive Index
PII	Provincial Integrity Index
PNG	Papua New Guinea
TI	Transparency International
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption

Executive Summary

Many countries in Asia-Pacific have undertaken the challenging task of developing an anti-corruption strategy. **Fourteen countries in this region have drafted an anti-corruption strategy,** which refers to a country's comprehensive anti-corruption policy document to coordinate national anti-corruption action. Anti-corruption strategies define a set of priority objectives to prevent and combat corruption. They also usually include action plans with implementation and monitoring mechanisms.

However, national anti-corruption strategies are a **relatively new phenomenon in Asia-Pacific,** with most efforts starting from 2007 onwards. Only two countries, Mongolia and Pakistan, drafted a strategy as early as 2002. This report explains the internal and external forces for the development of national anti-corruption strategies in the region. It also tries to identify common pitfalls at different stages of developing and implementing anti-corruption strategies, and provides recommendations to help countries develop effective anti-corruption strategies based on evidence.

A key driver for developing anti-corruption strategies in Asia-Pacific is the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 31 October 2003, UNCAC entered into force on 14 December 2005. Article 5 of the UNCAC makes it mandatory for member countries to have in place *"effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies".* It sometimes has been understood as a requirement for developing a single anti-corruption strategy although in reality anti-corruption policies may take different forms depending on the specific country context.

Anti-corruption policies range from a single national anti-corruption strategy to a set of measures to promote transparency and accountability. In addition to anti-corruption strategies, some countries in the region have introduced targeted approaches against corruption through risk assessments and sectoral approaches[1]. Alternatively, in some cases, countries in the region have—instead of an anti-corruption strategy—promoted broader efforts to promote transparency and accountability (in Australia, for example). Contrary to national anti-corruption strategies, such integrity measures might be implicit because they are embedded into wider governance or judicial reform programs[2].

Experience in the region shows that anti-corruption strategies are **easier to implement when they are incorporated within broader national development initiatives.** This integration into national development plans has proved an effective way to encourage cross-agency cooperation from the start and avoid silo approaches in promoting human development. For example, in Malaysia anti-corruption is one of the key national results areas pursued through the Government Transformation Programme, which aims to contribute in making the country a high-income nation as per its Vision 2020.

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1   In the Asia-Pacific region, UNDP is supporting efforts in China, Nepal, Philippines, and Thailand to promote sectoral approaches against corruption in water, education, and health.

2   In the case of implicit measures, there are no national anti-corruption strategy documents; anti-corruption programs are built into broader reform programs like civil service reform, tax reform, judicial reform, privatization, and decentralization programs. These programs are made to increase transparency, accountability, and integrity in the system. Implicit anti-corruption strategies are a common feature in developed countries; explicit anti-corruption strategies are found more often in developing countries. See Hussman (2007).

In addition to the ratification of UNCAC, there are other **external and internal factors that have propelled the drafting of anti-corruption strategies** in the Asia-Pacific region. Governments made commitments under various initiatives and regional agreements, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) / Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, the Financial Action Task Force, and the G-20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan. A degree of external compulsion—as manifested in donor conditionality—also is found in some foreign aid-dependent countries. On the other hand, internal factors have included changes in political or economic landscapes. In some Asia-Pacific countries, political changes or, more importantly, increased political freedom have resulted in the adoption of anti-corruption campaigns as a major plank of governance and political reform. Campaigns to fight corruption in the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan were launched after political changes. In some cases, internal motivation to fight corruption is also unique to the country situation. For example, Vietnam's efforts on fighting corruption were driven by the concern of losing the legitimacy of its one-party regime due to rampant corruption while Bhutan's aim at preventing the eruption of political corruption was a result of political changes in 2006.

In the Asia-Pacific region, anti-corruption strategies generally are found to be formulated in a broad manner in order to **provide a long-term vision on how to address corruption.** Most anti-corruption strategies are designed with long-term objectives, spanning from five to twenty years (Indonesia 2011-25, Maldives 2009-13, Papua New Guinea 2010-30). This indicates that fighting corruption has been envisioned as a long-term process. However, the risk is to develop a "wish list" without much effort to translate vision into action plans. For example this has been a barrier for implementing extensive administrative reform programmes in Afghanistan and Nepal. Specific action plans are essential to prioritise implementation in a phased approach. Also, some countries emphasize a focused approach to anti-corruption in the strategies based on a sound initial diagnostic to prioritise key reform areas (e.g., Malaysia).

In drafting their anti-corruption strategies, countries generally do not give enough attention to implementation and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The experience from the Asia-Pacific region is consistent with findings from other regions of the world that government stakeholders and donors seem more concerned with drafting an anti-corruption strategy to fulfil their international obligations than with carrying it out. The low priority given to implementation and M&E may stem from a *political factor* (Hussman, 2007). These processes sometimes are deliberately ignored or left out so that no one can be blamed specifically for implementation lapses and failures. In some cases, the government may lack motivation to implement the anti-corruption strategy in the first place. Another reason for slow implementation is the lack of capacity for implementation and M&E. Donor projects usually are too short to deal with such a long drawn-out process. Most anti-corruption agencies do not have a dedicated unit for M&E. Thus, little attention is devoted to M&E, not only for political reasons, but also because there is a lack of monitoring tools and data gathered on the corruption situation in the country.

While many governments may support the development of a strategy, a more objective indicator of commitment is how willing and how much are governments investing in anti-corruption. A way to gauge political commitment against corruption could be to measure "anti-corruption investments" made by governments. This might involve not only developing an anti-corruption strategy but also setting up related policies,

task force(s) and sufficient funding for anti-corruption agencies as implementing bodies. The lack of political commitment over time also can be a challenge for the sustainability of anti-corruption strategies. Political events after the adoption of the anti-corruption strategy might affect its implementation. For example, a new government might be less interested in implementing an anti-corruption strategy drafted by a previous government if the new government comes from a different political party. Experiences from Pakistan tell how a change in government led to the loss in momentum to implement the anti-corruption strategy. On the other hand, a strategy that is embedded in the overall government strategy (in Malaysia, for example) is likely to have a higher degree of ownership by the political leadership and a higher chance of implementation.

Most importantly, corruption measurement efforts are not sufficiently feeding into the monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption strategies. Commonly used measurement tools in Asia-Pacific include corruption surveys, integrity assessments/ corruption indexes, and institutional diagnostic studies. Corruption surveys are used to collect perceptions, experiences, and views of common people, business people, and public officials. However, they could be used in a more systematic way to monitor the implementation of anti-corruption strategies. One of the challenges here is that the majority of corruption surveys are organized by civil society organizations (CSOs) while drafting, implementation, and monitoring of the anti-corruption strategy rest primarily with state agencies. Enhanced collaboration between CSOs and state agencies, notably anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), should be encouraged to promote more effective evaluations of strategy implementation. In some countries like Mongolia, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, the law mandates these agencies to organize corruption surveys regularly. Such provisions also can help institutionalize corruption surveys and measurement practices as regular, nationally owned processes, rather than donor dependent, one-shot activities.

Another challenge is that **anti-corruption agencies are put in charge of very comprehensive national anti-corruption strategies.** Two factors might possibly account for the poor state of implementation and M&E. First, the implementation of the strategy rests with multiple agencies within the government and this makes coordination extremely difficult. Anti-corruption agencies, which are expected to undertake the task of implementation and M&E, often do not have enough resources and power to do so. Second, among the fallacies of an anti-corruption strategy is assigning overall responsibility for implementation to a specialized body like an anti-corruption agency, without taking into account that this agency often lacks the necessary authority to demand actions from powerful line ministries (Hussmann, 2007). Anti-corruption agencies can fulfil their role as effective coordination and monitoring agents only if they have a strong mandate from the centre of government and adequate resources.

To summarise major lessons learned, the gaps can be found at different stages of the anti-corruption strategy, hindering the effectiveness of such strategies in preventing and combating corruption. These include in particular:

- *In strategy development*. Lack of initial sound diagnostic and evidence-base to understand risk areas and gaps; limited involvement of stakeholders in the process to develop a common vision; and, deficient mechanisms to institutionalize the strategy and ensure its sustainability.

Diagnostic tools for anti-corruption strategies

Anti-corruption strategies should be based on a sound diagnostic of risk areas to prioritise reforms and provide a baseline to measure progress over time. Measurement tools in Asia-Pacific range from corruption surveys and corruption indices, to qualitative assessments based on interviews or news monitoring. Also, UNCAC self-assessments provide a valuable source of information on legal and institutional anti-corruption frameworks.

Measuring corruption has led to or at least coincided with the drafting of a national anti-corruption strategy in countries like Afghanistan, Bhutan, Mongolia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. In Bhutan, the results from corruption surveys were incorporated into the drafting of the national anti-corruption strategy. In Malaysia, the survey led to the formulation of a Malaysian Integrity Plan and the establishment of a Malaysian Institute of Integrity. In Afghanistan, corruption measurement practices coincided with the formulation of the national anti-corruption strategy and the establishment of an anti-corruption agency. In Mongolia, and Vietnam, national anti-corruption strategies were drafted after running corruption surveys.

• *In the design of its content.* Common pitfalls include setting overly ambitious goals; disconnecting the anti-corruption strategy from national development strategies and other reform agendas; and, having a poor implementation mechanism, which may stem from a lack of prioritization or unclear assignment of responsibilities.

Lessons learned from failed implementation

Experiences from Mongolia and Pakistan, which have already completed a cycle of implementing an anti-corruption strategy, provide some food for thought on why many anti-corruption strategies have a limited impact on preventing and combating corruption.

In Mongolia, the National Program on Corruption Control (NPCC 2002-2010) led to development of the anti-corruption law and the establishment of the anti-corruption agency in 2006. However it failed to achieve other goals because no budget was allocated for the strategy implementation, responsibilities were not clearly assigned to parties, and there were no performance indicators and monitoring mechanisms (Losolsuren, 2011).

Experience from Pakistan shows how unfolding political events, after drafting of an anti-corruption strategy, can affect its implementation. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NAB), a relatively weak agency, was made a focal point for implementing the strategy. Moreover, exclusion of the armed forces and the judiciary from being accountable under the strategy made it defunct from the start as it resulted into lack of commitment from key stakeholders (Suddle, 2011).

Successful implementation can only be achieved if all key stakeholders feel that they are part of the strategy from its early development. Also, responsibilities will need to be clearly assigned for the development and implementation of the strategy. Anti-corruption agencies can fulfil their role as effective coordination and monitoring agents only if they receive a strong mandate from the centre of government, adequate resources to fulfil their mandate, as well as commitment from other stakeholders to contribute to its implementation.

In the monitoring and evaluation of strategy: This is probably the most prevalent weakness of anti-corruption strategies, which often do not build-in a monitoring mechanism from the design phase. Countries tend to roll out the next phase of their national anti-corruption strategies without assessing the impact of their previous national strategy. Common challenges include the absence of reliable baseline data or the difficulty of identifying realistic targets that can be measured over time. Section II of the study shows how existing corruption measurement tools can be used more systematically to provide a baseline for the anti-corruption strategy and measure progress.

Monitoring progress over time: Examples of good practice

Data from corruption measurement have been used extensively to evaluate national anti-corruption strategies in countries such as Australia, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.

Since 1992, Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) has been collecting information annually through telephone opinion surveys. The objective has been to obtain information on public perceptions and attitudes towards corruption, effectiveness of the anti-corruption agency, and to track changes in public perception and attitudes over time.

The Independent Commission Against Corruption in New South Wales, Australia, has been organizing community attitude surveys since 1993 to gauge the public's views and knowledge regarding corruption and the perceived performance of the agency.

Malaysia provides an example of corruption measurement used to promote accountability for results. "Fighting Corruption" is one of the National Key Result Areas (NKRAs) of the Government Transformation Programme. The NKRAs are collectively owned by the Cabinet, with accountability for delivery resting on a Lead Minister, appointed and formally monitored by the Prime Minister. Four work streams were prioritized based on survey results that showed key areas for concern. These include strengthening the enforcement agency, tackling grand corruption, and improving government procurement. Data feeds into monitoring and evaluating the anti-corruption strategy.

The challenge of developing effective anti-corruption strategies and the **lack of guidance** in this area was recognised at the regional conference in Kuala Lumpur in October 2013, which was co-organised by the government of Malaysia, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). High level representatives of anti-corruption authorities as well as national planning authorities from South, East, and Southeast Asia and international anti-corruption experts developed ground-breaking guidance for developing, designing the content and monitoring the implementation of anti-corruption strategies (see *Kuala Lumpur Statement on Anti-Corruption Strategies* in Annex A).

The **Kuala Lumpur Statement on Anti-Corruption Strategies,** initially developed at the regional level, has become part of the global normative framework against corruption endorsed by the Conference of States Parties to the UN Convention against Corruption in November 2013 in Panama (it is referred to in Resolution 5/4: "Follow-up to the Marrakech declaration on the prevention of corruption").

Based initially on a desk review, this study has been enriched with countries' feedback and experiences shared during the Kuala Lumpur regional conference. Section I of the study reviews the drivers that prompted the development of anti-corruption strategies in the region, and the experiences in designing, implementing, and monitoring these strategies. Section II discusses the use of evidence-based corruption measurement tools to develop and monitor effective anti-corruption strategies. Section III offers a summary of five lessons in developing more effective anti-corruption strategies and measuring the performance of the strategy. Annexes of the study include the *Kuala Lumpur Statement on Anti-corruption Strategies* and the detailed country-per-country information on national anti-corruption strategies and surveys.

I. Overview of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Asia-Pacific

Fourteen countries in Asia-Pacific have drafted an anti-corruption strategy document (Table 1). In South Asia, almost all countries have anti-corruption strategies. In Southeast Asia, countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have adopted a strategy. Most countries drafted their strategy during 2007–2010—that is, after the entry into force of the UNCAC. Only two countries, Mongolia and Pakistan, have drafted anti-corruption strategies as early as 2002. After completing the first cycle, several countries such as Bhutan, Mongolia, Thailand, and Indonesia are in a second cycle of updating their anti-corruption strategies. In the Pacific, anti-corruption strategies remain rare. For example Papua New Guinea is the only country that has adopted such a strategy. Although they do not have an anti-corruption strategy *per se,* some countries in Asia-Pacific such as Australia, China and Bangladesh have a national anti-corruption action plan.

Table 1: Anti-corruption strategies in Asia-Pacific.

Country	Ratification of UNCAC	Title of Anti-Corruption Strategy Document
Afghanistan	25 Aug. 2008	Strategy and Policy for Anti-Corruption and Administrative Reform 2008 (also called the Azimi Report)
Australia	7 Dec. 2005	National Anti-Corruption Plan, September 2011
Bhutan	Signatory on 15 Sept. 2005 (no ratification yet)	National Integrity & Anti-corruption Strategy 2013–2018
India	9 May 2011	National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2010
Indonesia	19 Sept. 2006	National Strategy on Corruption Prevention and Eradication, 2011–2025 (STRANAS PPK)
Malaysia	24 Sept. 2008	Government Transformation Plan-National Key Result Areas (NKRA)–Fighting Corruption, 2009
Maldives	22 March 2007	Eliminating Corruption, under National Framework for Development 2009–2013
Mongolia	11 Jan. 2006	National Program for Combating Corruption (2002–2010); drafting new strategy.
Nepal	31 March 2011	Strategy and Action Plan against Corruption, 2010
Pakistan	31 Aug. 2007	National Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2002
Philippines	8 Nov. 2006	Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Cluster (GGAC) plan for 2012–16
Papua New Guinea	16 July 2007	National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2010–2030
Thailand	1 March 2011	National Anti-corruption Strategy 2007, new strategy under development.
Vietnam	19 Aug. 2009	National Strategy for Prevention and Combating Corruption towards 2020

Before the UNCAC came into force in 2005[3], few countries developed national anti-corruption strategies (e.g. Mongolia and Pakistan as early as 2000). Efforts to build anti-corruption strategies and policies are an inherent part of the evolution of governments and democratic governance. During the last two decades considerable amounts of national, regional and international resources have been invested in administrative reform efforts toward more transparent and accountable governments with the ability to prevent and sanction corrupt practices.

The gaps observed in Asia-Pacific are not uniquely region-specific. There are similar lessons learned in other regions of the world, including Latin America, which can guide future initiatives in Asia-Pacific (see Box 1).

Box 1: Anti-corruption Policies—Initial Lessons from Latin America

A joint effort by the UNODC Regional Office in Panama and the Democratic Governance Area of the UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean produced an initial analysis of the Latin American experience with anti-corruption policies. The study focused on the experiences of Argentina, Colombia, Chile, El Salvador and Mexico, in the design and implementation of anti-corruption policies, captures the rich discussions that occurred in the context of a Regional Workshop in Panama in which representatives of corruption prevention entities and senior management professionals from anti-corruption offices, experts and specialists from UNODC and UNDP, and representatives of civil society participated.

The study examines the progress of policy processes and actions in all five cases, the regulatory context, characteristics, stakeholders and major challenges. An initial basic framework for reflection emerges to understand the design, implementation, critical junctures for the adoption of anti-corruption policies and other elements necessary for sustainability. Rather than evaluating and/or providing recipes, this document instead focuses more on systematizing processes to identify useful lessons. Its intention is not to judge or evaluate the quality of policies and/or efforts in the countries mentioned above. By systematically looking at the design and implementation of anti-corruption policies in each country, this document aims to contribute to the dialogue and knowledge on anti-corruption policies in Latin America.

This complex and multi-dimensional dynamic also generates a series of dilemmas for the analysis of anti-corruption policy that was widely analysed in the workshop. For example, participants in the workshop inquired and asked about how they can assess whether or not a country has an anti-corruption policy. Similarly, it is no less important to inquire how to distinguish or differentiate an anti-corruption agenda from an anti-corruption strategy, and these from anti-corruption policies. There are also no magic formulas to determine whether anti-corruption policies should be only preventive and/or punitive, which combination is the most appropriate and/or balanced between preventive and/or punitive. Finally, another dilemma was if some ad hoc actions could promote transparency and accountability in public administration, without necessarily being part of an anti-corruption policies framework.

The initial analysis of the experience of the five cases in Latin America shows that a combination of internal and external factors can drive the design and implementation of anti-corruption policies. In some cases, the demand was generated by a reaction of citizens, civil society and the media in response to corruption scandals. In others, the business sector has pressured to ensure greater investment and economic opportunities for the country. Finally, it is worthy to note the momentum generated by the need to transpose the corpus juris of the obligations of the Conventions and other international anti-corruption initiatives, particularly in their review mechanisms, which has promoted national anti-corruption initiatives.

Source: UNDP/UNODC. An Initial Reflection on Anti-corruption Policies: Selected Inputs for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption from the Latin American Experience, 2013. Click here to download the full Report.

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3   The UNCAC calls for developing and implementing or maintaining effective and coordinated anti-corruption policies.

A. Driving forces for anti-corruption strategies in Asia-Pacific

Both external and internal forces have pushed countries to draft anti-corruption strategies in the Asia-Pacific region. The first generation of anti-corruption strategies, which were more implicit in nature, were linked directly or indirectly to the global anti-corruption movement and the push for democratic governance that gathered momentum in the mid-1990s. This period was marked by events like the establishment of Transparency International (1993), development of the OECD and European Union (EU) conventions against corruption (1997), the World Bank's re-emphasis on the role of the state in development (1997), and the publication by UNDP of its South Asia Human Development Report with its focus on governance (1999).

The global movement pushed countries to launch anti-corruption drives and, as a corollary, to draft anti-corruption strategies. However, a real push came with the entry into force of the UNCAC in 2005. Article 5 of UNCAC makes it mandatory for member countries to draft an "effective and coordinated anti-corruption policy" as well as "periodically evaluate relevant legal instruments and administrative measures". Article 6 of the Convention also requires the existence of preventive anti-corruption bodies to oversee and coordinate their implementation. Most countries listed in Table 2.1 have drafted anti-corruption strategies after 2005. In Asia-Pacific, only four countries—Democratic Republic of Korea, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu—are non-participating countries to UNCAC. Japan, Bhutan, and New Zealand are signatories but have not ratified this treaty. In the region, 34 countries have ratified or acceded to UNCAC.

The ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative is another factor guiding countries in the region to draft an anti-corruption strategy. To date, 31 Asia-Pacific economies have endorsed the Initiative's Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific.[4] The Action Plan sets out the goals and standards for sustainable safeguards against corruption in the economic, political and social spheres of the economies in the region. By endorsing the Action Plan, the Initiative's member economies committed to undertake meaningful reform to bolster their safeguards against corruption.[5] According to a review of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative, the Action Plan was the only framework for anti-corruption in the region prior to 2005. However, with the entry into force of UNCAC, countries now treat UNCAC as the main framework for anti-corruption (Garnett & Kwok, 2009). UNDP has supported several countries to draft anti-corruption strategies, notably Bhutan, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, and PNG.

Besides external factors, there also are several country-specific factors that pushed countries in Asia-Pacific to draft anti-corruption strategies. The first factor is the Asian financial crisis of 1997. This crisis originated from Thailand and eventually spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and the Republic of Korea. The crisis revealed how corruption—dubbed as "crony capitalism"—deeply affected the emerging economies in Asia-Pacific. It sparked

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4   Afghanistan; Australia; Bangladesh; Bhutan; Cambodia; People's Republic of China; Cook Islands; Fiji Islands; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Kazakhstan; Republic of Korea; Kyrgyz Republic; Macao, China; Malaysia; Mongolia; Nepal; Pakistan; Palau; Papua New Guinea; the Philippines; Samoa; Singapore; the Solomon Islands; Sri Lanka; Thailand; Timor-Leste; Vanuatu; and Vietnam (See ADB/OECD, *Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific—Member countries and economies.* Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/ theinitiativesmembercountriesandeconomies.htm.)

5   See ADB/OECD, *Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific–Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan.* Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/implementationoftheanti- corruptionactionplan.htm.

political tensions and changes in countries like Thailand, Indonesia, and Republic of Korea. It paved the way to political freedom, and opened the door to anti-corruption as an agenda of political discourse. Bhutan, which scored highest in South Asia in TI's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), has invested in the prevention of *future corruption*. The Bhutanese anti-corruption strategy speaks of current corruption to be at a low-level and manageable. However, after political changes in 2006, when Bhutan switched from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, the country was worried about a possible eruption of corruption, particularly, political corruption. This pushed the anti-corruption drive in Bhutan. In China and Vietnam, corruption poses a threat to the ruling communist parties' legitimacy and stability. This has called for the drafting of anti-corruption strategies in these countries. In the case of Bangladesh, a caretaker government in 2007 took the initiative to fight corruption. As this caretaker government was less tied up to political interests, it had the liberty of fighting corruption more wholeheartedly.

The second factor is the series of corruption scandals exposed by the media in the early 2000s, leading to several heads of government being removed from office or convicted. Peaceful protest forced Philippine president Joseph Ejercito Estrada to step down in January 2001. In July 2001, Indonesia's parliament removed President Abdurrahman Wahid from office partly because of corruption allegations. Thaksin Shinawatra, prime minister of Thailand, was indicted for corruption although eventually acquitted in a controversial decision by the country's Constitutional Court in 2001 (Phongpaichit, 2003). In 2002, the convictions of two sons of President Kim Dae-Jung of the Republic of Korea on corruption charges tarnished the image of the president. Other high-level political leaders were convicted on corruption-related charges in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (Bhargava & Bolongaita, 2004).

In certain countries, political transition and economic liberalisation provided opportunities for new forms of corruption. In China, economic reform in 1978 and, particularly after 1990s, saw an *intensification of corruption,* i.e., high-stake corruption occurring at higher places of leadership (Wedeman, 2004). Dr. Hu Zengrong from Beijing Broadcasting University mentions four waves of corruption sweeping across China: (a) the first wave, which was concentrated in the consumer market in the early 1980s, (b) the second wave, concentrated in the producers' good market with the existence of a dual price mechanism, which lasted up to the early 1990s, (c) the third wave, from 1993-1995, concentrated in the stock market, real estate market, and capital market, and, (d) the fourth wave, now taking place, concentrated in the restructuring of state-owned enterprises and state assets, played primarily by senior officials and the bosses of state-owned enterprises (Hu & Li, 2004). Similarly, much of the corruption in Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cambodia can be seen as rooted in political changes and transitions.

The Republic of Korea has a different story to tell. The establishment of a civilian government in 1993 saw a rise in both corruption and the state's determination to fight corruption. With growing economic success and decline in threats from the North, military rulers in the Republic of Korea lost their legitimacy and eventually paved the way for civilian governments. By 1998, the Republic of Korea declared a *War on Corruption*. Within ten years, the Republic of Korea has been able to effectively control corruption (Transparency International [TI], 2006). After Hong Kong, Singapore, and Australia, the Republic of Korea is now regarded as another success story worth emulating.

In the case of South Asia, the anti-corruption drive arrived only after 2000. *Human Development in South Asia 1999: The Crisis of Governance* (Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre [MHHDC], 1999) reported on the pervasiveness of corruption in the region. The report outlined several distinct features of corruption in South Asia, including the following:

- Corruption occurs up-stream, at higher places, not downstream
- Corruption money has wings, not wheels, meaning they are deposited abroad.
- Corruption leads to promotion, not prison.
- Corruption occurs with 515 million people in poverty.

In South Asia, corruption has evolved over a period of time. It has floated upwards—from petty corruption in the 1950s to mid-level corruption in the 1960s and 1970s, to corruption at the very highest levels of the state in the 1980s and 1990s (MHHDC, 1999). Much of the corruption in South Asia is ascribed to military rule or prolonged rule by a one-party oligarchy, existence of extreme poverty and inequality, and a strong patronage system. Though all countries in South Asia are now electoral democracies, elections seem to have no or little effect on curbing corruption. In the absence of strong state institutions to enforce the rule of law, electoral democracy, instead of curbing corruption, seems to have fuelled corruption.

The criminalization of politics, i.e., the use of criminals and musclemen in politics, and the prevalence of confrontational politics has made *political corruption* to be the mother of all corruption in South Asia (TI, 2004a). Post-independent India has coincided with a decline in the standards of conduct in the political leadership, which led to a general acceptance of corruption in public life (Jain & Bawa, 2003). As India steps into high economic growth, there is lately an awakening against corruption. *The Economist* reported that business firms in India have thrived in spite of the weak state; they need to make sure they do not thrive because of it (The Economist, 2011). In August 2011, mass public demonstrations, led by social activist, Anna Hazare, were organized in India, demanding the introduction of an effective anti-corruption bill (*Lokpal* bill), which the Indian parliament approved on 18 December 2013—30 years after it was first introduced.

Corruption is prevalent in the Pacific, especially in smaller island countries. A study on national integrity systems in 12 island countries reported that there is vagueness and disagreement in understanding what constitutes 'corruption' in the region (TI, 2004b). This is particularly true with reference to the culture of gift giving and patronage systems. Interestingly, the report speaks of smaller countries posing special corruption risks. The risks come from traditional cultural or familial factors affecting the willingness to act against corruption. In recent years, several Pacific island countries have ratified UNCAC, indicating recognition of the problem and their commitment to tackle corruption.

Donor agencies have also put pressure on governments to address corruption, especially in post-conflict environments. Afghanistan and Cambodia are two examples of countries where pressure from donors has encouraged the drafting of national anti-corruption strategies. For example the High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption in Afghanistan was set up in 2008 to implement the national anti-corruption strategy in the follow-up of the London and Kabul international conferences on Afghanistan. The same can be said about Nepal's anti-corruption drive in 2002–2004. The intensification of the Maoist conflict in 2001 exerted extreme financial pressure on the government. This called for budgetary support from donor institutions, that—in turn—demanded measures to mitigate fiduciary risks. This

led to the birth of a new anti-corruption law in 2002, which subsequently paved the way to an intensive anti-corruption drive in 2002–2004 and the drafting of the first anti-corruption action plan in 2003. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank are exerting pressure on the country to draft an anti-corruption strategy.

B. Contents of anti-corruption strategies–design stage

There are wide varieties of anti-corruption strategies in the Asia-Pacific region, depending on the objectives pursued, the stakeholders involved, and the level of details in specifying reform areas. Ideally an anti-corruption strategy should have a clear, common vision on how to address corruption. Its action plan should set out a detailed description of concrete actions, deadlines, actors involved, budget allocations, and monitoring indicators.

This section looks into some similarities found in country-specific anti-corruption strategies and then reviews their differences. Information related to anti-corruption strategies in 14 Asia-Pacific countries is given in Annex D while some more detailed features of national anti-corruption strategies in 10 other countries are given in Annex E.

1.   Similarities in anti-corruption strategies

Situation analysis. All anti-corruption strategies contain some analysis of the corruption situation like major forms of corruption, including their possible impacts on the economy and society (i.e. some estimation of losses due to corruption), as well as analysis of the causes of corruption.

Structure: Most anti-corruption strategies outline vision, mission, objectives, and priority areas for combating corruption (see Annex E). Almost all national anti-corruption strategies contain a statement defining a vision of what the strategy aims to achieve.

Components. Normally, the strategies and action plans are broken down into activities/ interventions, responsible agencies, time framework, and sometimes budget allocations (as in Pakistan and Nepal). Some strategies also have output indicators to measure the progress in strategy implementation (e.g., Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Malaysia).

Timeline. Time horizons often are broken down into long-term, medium-term and short-term, as in Pakistan and PNG. Anti-corruption strategies in Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Indonesia are implemented in phases.

Connection with national development plan/strategy. In some cases, the anti-corruption strategy is subsumed within a broader national development plan as in Malaysia (Government Transformation Programme under Vision 2020), Maldives (The Strategic Action Plan: National Framework for Development 2009–2013), and in PNG (Vision 2050).

Strategic focus areas. Strategic entry points include corruption prevention, law enforcement, public education and awareness-raising and wide collaboration with private sector, civil society, media and the international community (see Annex E).

Process description. Some anti-corruption strategies elaborate the process for developing the strategy. Usually, anti-corruption strategies were prepared through collaboration, discussion with various stakeholders, or even public participation. This is further discussed in Section II of this paper.

Implementation mechanism. Most anti-corruption strategies also contain provisions on the institutional set-up to implement it. However, M&E is covered only in rare cases.

2. Dissimilarities in anti-corruption strategies

The sequencing with the establishment of anti-corruption agencies. Anti-corruption strategies and agencies are usually interlinked, but there are two different scenarios in the Asia-Pacific region. In some cases the strategy precedes, and actually envisions the establishment of an anti-corruption agency. In other cases the strategy follows the establishment and actually is found to be conceived by the agency. For example, in the case of Bhutan, the ACA coordinated the development of the anti-corruption strategy in order to translate government's zero tolerance policy against corruption. In Papua New Guinea, the strategy preceded the establishment of the ACA and one of the objectives of the strategy is to establish a strong and independent ACA. In the case of Mongolia, the drafting of the first anti-corruption strategy preceded the establishment of the ACA while the drafting of the second one is coordinated by the ACA. The relationship between anti-corruption strategy and the anti-corruption agency might be different according to each country; however, in many countries, the responsibility to draft the anti-corruption strategy is given to the agency. For example in Afghanistan the ACA was originally established as the High Office of Oversight on Implementation of the National Anti-corruption Strategy to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy.

> Box 2: Conditions for effective anti-corruption agencies.
>
> In practice anti-corruption agencies in the region are often undermined in their role to develop and/or implement anti-corruption strategies because of weak political will, manifested in limited resources and staff capacity. Also they sometimes have the tendency to centralise anti-corruption efforts instead of engaging various stakeholders in the process. Such engagement of stakeholders is essential to build ownership and help to ensure the acceptability and effectiveness of strategies adopted.
>
> To help anti-corruption agencies to be more effective in preventing and combating corruption, the UNDP together with UNODC and other partners developed the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies at a UNDP/UNODC Conference hosted by the Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia. The Principles highlight that effective ACAs tend to be well-resourced, headed by strong leadership with visible integrity and commitment, and situated amongst a network of state and non-state actors who work together to implement anti-corruption interventions.
>
> See http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session5/V1388018e.pdf, and the UNDP study on South-South Exchange on Effective Anti-Corruption Agencies: Bhutan, Maldives, Timor-Leste (http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20 Governance/Anti-corruption/South-South%20AntiCorruption%20Agencies%202012.pdf).

Use of corruption surveys. In drafting their anti-corruption strategies, Bhutan and India used inputs from corruption perception surveys. On the other hand in Malaysia and Vietnam corruption perception surveys were among the measures introduced as part of the anti-corruption strategies to track progress over time.

Length. The length of anti-corruption strategies varies significantly across countries in the region. The anti-corruption strategy in Maldives, including its action plan, is not more than 12 pages long while in Afghanistan it spreads over 194 pages. Nepal's anti-corruption action plan stretches to over 134 pages. The challenge is to design a clearly articulated

document that communicates a vision of how to address corruption while avoiding the creation of a "wish list" with overambitious objectives or unnecessary details. For example, the anti-corruption strategy of Afghanistan is so broad and encompassing that it is difficult to prioritise actions as well as identify roles and responsibilities for implementation. To be effective, strategies need to be accompanied by an action plan to prioritise and sequence implementation.

C. Process for developing the anti-corruption strategy

A **high-level taskforce or committee** is usually set up to draft the anti-corruption strategy. This is observed in several countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bhutan, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Nepal. The call to draft an anti-corruption strategy often comes from the highest authority in the government—the President or Prime Minister's Office—giving an indication of political will to combat corruption. Secretariat support is usually provided by the ACA. In many cases, the ACA is the lead agency involved in taking the initiative or actually involved in drafting the anti-corruption strategy document. Where the ACA is not involved, the Office of the President, the Prime Minister's Office or the Cabinet takes the lead. In Nepal, the Prime Minister's Office took the initiative in drafting the anti-corruption strategy and its action plans as well as monitoring their implementation.

Where **donor support** is available, services of international experts also can be used to support the drafting of the anti-corruption strategy. This expertise is useful, especially in terms of sharing lessons from other countries. This is observed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bhutan, PNG, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Timor-Leste. However, there is always a risk that donor support undermines ownership of the anti-corruption strategy. The likelihood of an anti-corruption strategy being implemented diminishes when the country's institutions do not own the strategy or the development of such a strategy becomes a technical exercise to give lip-service to donor pressure.

Experience in the region shows that **external and internal consultations** during the drafting process are key for the successful implementation of strategies. A series of workshops, consultative meetings, and academic seminars should be organized, preferably in different parts of the country, to have public participation and stakeholders' involvement. The public also should be invited to submit their views. The anti-corruption strategy in Afghanistan entailed 64 rounds of meetings. In the case of Pakistan eight rounds of consultative workshops were organized in different parts of the country. In Thailand, advice was sought from seven universities. In Malaysia, officers from senior government agencies, government-linked corporations, and non-government organizations (NGOs) participated in a 6-week-long laboratory before coming up with national key results areas (NKRAs) for measuring the strategy implementation. In Nepal, TI reviewed in 2011 the implementation plan of the strategy and found that it was prepared without consulting anti-corruption agencies (Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority [CIAA] and the National Vigilance Council [NVC]) and other key stakeholders (Ministry of Education). This hampered the implementation of the strategy.

Because of extensive consultations, it often takes a long time to draft an anti-corruption strategy that reflects a common vision among key stakeholders. Sometimes successive governments are involved. Drafting of an anti-corruption strategy is a **time-consuming process.** Some countries in Asia-Pacific may have drafted their anti-corruption strategy relatively quickly. For example, it took PNG only six months to draft its strategy, and

another 18 months to have the government adopt it. In Pakistan, the drafting of its 2002 anti-corruption strategy took 13 months. Experiences from other countries indicate that the drafting of an anti-corruption strategy takes anywhere from one to two years. Nepal presents another case where the strategy was drafted by one government in 2008. It took two years for another government to draft Action Plans in 2010. Implementation of these Action Plans rested with a third government in 2011.

D. Implementation and M&E mechanisms

Although more than a dozen countries have developed anti-corruption strategies in the region, few of them have an effective implementation mechanism including an action plan with clear roles and responsibilities. Moreover, few strategies built in elements of evaluation and data collection from the design phase. The challenge faced by many countries is to define measurable indicators, with established guidelines and tracking mechanisms, in order to determine whether targets are being achieved.

Although many countries' national strategies are weak on M&E, Malaysia offers an example of good practice. Malaysia's strategy contains details on benchmarks, time-bound performance targets, and performance indicators to measure progress in implementation. The anti-corruption strategy monitoring system in Malaysia uses both local and global measures for performance monitoring (see Table 2). The Malaysian government also established a special division to monitor implementation progress (NKRA Monitoring & Coordination Division, 2013). Corruption indicators like Transparency International's CPI and Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) are used to measure performance because these indicators are outside their control.

Table 2: National Key Performance Index for Fighting Corruption, Malaysia.

OVERVIEW OF 2012 KPI ACHIEVEMENTS			
Performance Indicators	Target 2012	Actual Achievement	Result
No. of Ministries scoring above 90% on the Procurement Accountability Index	25%	18	72%
No. of arrest cases brought to trial	25%	34.7%	139%
Percentage of companies announcing Entry Point Projects (EPPs) in Progress Update to sign to CIP	100%	100%	100%
No. of people in the database of convicted offenders	300	395	132%
No. of summons issued vs. Total hours of operations (PDRM Traffic)	13	18	138%
No. of summons settled vs. No. of summons issued by JPJ	60%	47.53%	79%
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index	4.9	49% (change in methodology in 2012)	100%
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer survey	52%	NA (results to be released June 2013)	NA
Percentage of trials completed within a year	70%	75.5%	108%
Percentage of Government procurement secured under the Integrity Pact	100%	85%	85%
TNS Perception Survey on how much enforcement agencies are perceived to be corrupt	275	294	92%
Whistleblower protection awareness and satisfaction survey result	50%	26.8%	54%
Full-fledged implementation of the Political Funding initiative which includes funds being credited directly into party accounts, properly recorded and available for audit	100%	50%	50%
Percentage of completion of Compliance Unit activities	85%	93%	109%
Commence reporting corruption-related cases under Whistleblower Act	100%	100%	100%
Average			97%

90% Above — Achievement of 90% and above
51% to 89% — Achievement of 51% to 89%
50% Below — Achievement of 50% and below

Source: Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU), Prime Minister's Department, Government of Malaysia. "Fighting Corruption: Building a Fair and Just Nation", in **Government Transformation Programme-Annual Report 2012,** *p. 79. Retrieved from http://www.pemandu.gov.my/gtp/annualreport2012/upload/Eng_GTP2012_AR_05_Fighting_Corruption.pdf*

Thailand is another country where the anti-corruption strategy contains a separate, detailed section on coordinating the cooperation between various stakeholders, developing management systems, establishing standards, and monitoring and evaluating performance (see Box 2).

Box 3: Mechanisms for Implementing the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, Thailand.

In Thailand the current constitution specifies that National Anti-Corruption Commission is an independent agency and the prime mover for anti-corruption. Accordingly, the agency is the main coordinator to draft and implement the NACS. It has introduced the following mechanisms to help implement and monitor the strategy:

- Coordination: A number of committees have been established to enhance cooperation from all social sectors, i.e. the public sector, the private sector, civil society, media and political sector.
- Management: Decentralization of authority, improvement in legislations, rules, regulations and orders.
- Standards: Establishment of works system standards and codes of conduct.
- Monitoring and evaluation: Various types of monitoring and evaluation systems like pre, mid and post implementation.

However the agency sometimes lacks the high-level political support from the Cabinet to mobilise other government agencies. Somehow, this situation limits its role in translating the national anti-corruption strategy into action.

Source: National Anti-Corruption Strategy, Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, Thailand.

A major obstacle to the success of anti-corruption strategies in many countries in Asia Pacific has been the absence of tangible benchmarks and tracking mechanisms to determine whether targets have been achieved. Corruption measurement and monitoring should be an integral part of any anti-corruption strategy. If a country lacks monitoring tools and actual corruption data, it will devote little attention to systematic monitoring and measurement of progress made against corruption. This underscores the link between corruption measurement and corruption strategy M&E systems. However most corruption surveys are organized by CSOs, while drafting, implementation, and monitoring of an anti-corruption strategy is done by state agencies. There is a gap between the corruption measurement system and the use of corruption data by the state agencies for monitoring and evaluating an anti-corruption strategy. In this respect the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) of the Republic of Korea provides a good example of partnership with Universities in conducting integrity assessments of public institutions since 2002. The decision on which agency will coordinate implementation of an anti-corruption strategy is often made at the highest level of authority, such as the president's office, the prime minister's office (Nepal), or the cabinet (Bhutan). Yet, there can be confusion and duplication on who is actually responsible for implementation and M&E. Strategy implementation usually rests with dispersed agencies, making it relatively difficult to undertake progress monitoring. There also might be confusion on the role and responsibilities of the agencies involved because of the multiplicity of strategies and frameworks. In Afghanistan there are various frameworks in addition to the national anti-corruption strategy, including the National Development Strategy as well as actions plans established by the Governance Cluster as a result of international conferences with donor countries.

In many cases, the specialized ACA is put in charge of implementing and monitoring national anti-corruption strategies. The risk is to assign the overall responsibility for implementation of the strategy to a specialized body like an ACA, in cases when this agency lacks the authority to demand actions from powerful line ministries (Hussmann, 2007). To coordinate and monitor effectively, an ACA should have adequate mandate, resources, and high-level leadership support. For example, in Thailand the National Anti-Corruption Commission lacks the high-level political support from the Cabinet to mobilise other government agencies in the implementation of the strategy. This situation limits its coordination role in translating the national anti-corruption strategy into action (see box 2 above).

Many countries in Asia-Pacific either drafted their anti-corruption strategies only recently or just started implementing their strategies. They are still in the process of developing M&E systems. Therefore, in some cases, little information is available on how they are carrying out M&E of their anti-corruption strategies. Bhutan developed monitoring indicators as part of its new strategy "National Integrity & Anti-Corruption Strategy 2013-2018". PNG's anti-corruption strategy calls for developing a five-year Implementation Plan and the establishment of a strong and independent ACA to monitor progress.

Indonesia and the Republic of Korea use surveys to evaluate their anti-corruption strategies while successful anti-corruption agencies like Hong Kong's ICAC, Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), and NSW Australia's ICAC use regular public opinion surveys to evaluate their performance. However, while most countries in the region with anti-corruption strategies have implementation mechanisms in place, regular monitoring and evaluation is often overlooked.

In October 2013, UNODC conducted an online survey of anti-corruption practitioners in Asia-Pacific as part of preparations for a Regional Meeting on Anti-Corruption Strategies in Kuala Lumpur, which brought together representatives from anti-corruption and planning authorities from countries in South, East, and Southeast Asia. The results of the survey strongly indicate that national anti-corruption strategies have a need for M&E systems. Sixty per cent of respondents said their country had an anti-corruption strategy (Fig. 1). Asked whether their anti-corruption strategy has even been evaluated, 71 per cent answered in the negative (Fig. 2). The survey also asked respondents about the perceived usefulness and impact of their country's anti-corruption strategies and the effectiveness of the institutional set-up to carry it out. The results are shown in Fig. 3.

Figure 1: Is there an anti-corruption strategy in your country? (N=68)

No 39.7

Yes 60.3

Figure 2: Has the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy ever been evaluated? (N=41)

Yes 29.3

No 70.7

Figure 3: Usefulness of national anti-corruption strategy

Is the anti-corruption strategy useful? (N=44)

| Extremely useful | Very useful | useful | Fairly useful | Not useful |

How do you assess its impact in your country? (N=43)

| Highly significant | Very significant | significantl | Fairly significant | Not significant |

How effective is the institutional set-up to implement your national anti-corruption strategy? (N=45)

| Highly significant | Very significant | significantl | Fairly significant | Not significant |

II. Developing and Evaluating Evidence-Based Anti-Corruption Strategies—The Role of Measurement

This section discusses how corruption measurement tools can be used more systematically to develop and monitor effective anti-corruption strategies. Almost all countries in Asia-Pacific measure corruption. Some countries started as early as the 1990s although the measurement movement spread in the region only in the last ten years. However corruption measurement is rarely linked directly to the development and review of implementation of anti-corruption strategies. Governments could use this opportunity to ground anti-corruption strategies into evidence-based data and offer a baseline for measuring progress over time.

A. Corruption surveys are commonly used in Asia-Pacific

Most countries in Asia-Pacific have mechanisms to measure corruption levels. Some countries in the region introduced corruption measurement tools as early as the end of the 1990s but the tools became popular in mid-2000. Countries from South Asia like Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan have extensively used corruption measurement tools. Some countries in South East Asia like Cambodia, Indonesia, Republic of Korea and Vietnam are also at the forefront in the use of corruption measurement tools. The national corruption measurement practices in Asia-Pacific have often appeared in response to the limitations of global corruption measurement practices. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) has raised awareness about the extent of corruption, however it has never provided contextualised actionable data that policy-makers can use to address corruption problems in a given country. The corruption surveys in India and Thailand were triggered by their poor ratings on Transparency International's CPI and a survey in Timor-Leste was triggered by dramatic swings in its CPI. Moreover, in many cases, national anti-corruption surveys are not routinely conducted making it very difficult to compare data and track progress over time.

Among all corruption measurement tools used in Asia-Pacific, corruption surveys are the most popular and widely used. Almost all countries in Asia-Pacific have undertaken corruption surveys. National surveys are the norm, whereas local surveys are exceptional, done mostly in large countries like India, Indonesia, and Australia. Out of the listed 19 countries in Asia-Pacific, Australia, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, and the Philippines have introduced surveys prior to 2000. The ICAC of New South Wales, Australia, has been organizing community attitude surveys since 1993. Maldives and Timor-Leste introduced national-level surveys more recently. Sri Lanka has undertaken several surveys at the sectoral level (see Annex B for a list of corruption surveys in Asia-Pacific).

Countries in Asia-Pacific have relied on the use of a wide variety of sources to ensure the accuracy of survey results. Structured, face-to-face interviews with household members

are the primary tool for collecting information. Few countries use telephone interviews and on-line surveys. Often, surveys collect the views of public officials, common citizens, business persons, youths, rural people, urban people, etc. For example, the World Bank diagnostic surveys conducted in various countries in the region such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Indonesia collect the views from three perspectives, namely, (1) public servants, (2) private sector business firms, and (3) households. This *triangulation* method is now widely popular. Both *quantitative data* (collected through household surveys) and qualitative data (collected through workshops and focus group discussion) are undertaken to ensure the validity and reliability of the data collected.

Corruption measurement can also be used at the local level, in particular to measure direct experiences of citizens with provincial and local authorities' governance and public administration performance. Initiated in 2009, the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) is the largest governance survey of citizens in Viet Nam, which looks at six dimensions, 'Participation at Local Levels', 'Transparency', 'Vertical Accountability', 'Control of Corruption in the Public Sector', 'Public Administrative Procedures' and 'Public Service Delivery'. Interestingly 'Control of Corruption in the Public Sector' is the dimension where citizens experience the highest inequality each year.

Apart from corruption surveys, other commonly used tools to measure corruption include corruption indices (e.g. Afghanistan provincial integrity index, Mongolian corruption index), qualitative assessments based on interviews, news monitoring and crowdsourcing. Annex C provides details for each of these measurement tools used in Asia-Pacific.

UNCAC self-assessments also are increasingly used to provide information on gaps in legal and institutional anti-corruption frameworks. UNDP has supported countries in the region to undertake participatory self-assessments involving various stakeholders based on UNDP's. *Guidance Note: UNCAC Self-Assessments—Going Beyond the Minimum* (UNDP, 2010).

In some countries, several measurement tools are used simultaneously. Vietnam, for example, uses several tools like the Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI), Provincial Competitive Index (PCI), small-scale self-conducted surveys to understand corruption problems in specific sectors (education, health, land management and construction), bi-annual corruption dialogues, and UNCAC self-assessment.

A relatively new platform to spotcheck the quality of governance and report corrupt behaviour is "crowdsourcing", a word coined June 2006 in *Wired* magazine (Howe, 2006). Examples of crowdsourcing in Asia-Pacific to support anti-corruption efforts include *ipaidabribe* (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal), *Checkmyschool* (Philippines), *Bribespot* (available in Thai, Hindi, Tamil, Urdu, Indonesian, and Javanese languages), *Lapor* (Indonesia), and *Citizen Feedback Model* (Pakistan). Annex C contains a short description of these crowdsourcing projects.

Table 3: Summary of corruption measurement and assessment tools.

Tool	Characteristics
Survey of perceptions & attitudes	Usually national level. Effective in raising awareness about extent of corruption. Does not always provide actionable data for policymaking.
Documenting/compiling experiences of corruption, bribery, etc.	Measures direct experiences of citizens. Can be used to measure experience of local governance and public administration performance (e.g., Vietnam *Public Administration Performance Index*)
Public integrity assessment	These tools "usually aim to assess the institutional framework for promoting integrity and combating corruption across the public sector, and/or to identify corruption or corruption risks within specific government agencies and/or among public officials." (Martini & U Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2012).
Assessing systems, institutions and legal frameworks	Example is the voluntary UNCAC compliance review/gap analysis by a national expert team.
Assessing capacity/performance of anti-corruption agencies	Looks at (1) Functional or core capacities—capacities necessary for managing ACAs; and, (2) Technical capacities—specific areas of professional expertise or knowledge linked to specific functions of anti-corruption agencies. (See UNDP 2011).

E. From advocacy to informing anti-corruption measures

Initially, corruption measurement in the region was used to raise public awareness about corruption. Media reporting of corruption surveys and diagnostic studies help inform the public about the negative consequences of corruption and mobilise stakeholders against corruption through advocacy campaigns. In the Philippines, for example, the results of corruption surveys by the non-profit Social Weather Stations led to the formation of a civil society umbrella group called the Coalition Against Corruption. Surveys can trigger public support for anti-corruption action. In Vanuatu, the results of a corruption measurement survey pushed the government to ratify the UNCAC. When surveys estimate the amount of monetary loss due to corruption, the message becomes an effective tool for public sensitization and advocacy. Surveys in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Cambodia have estimated the cost of corruption in those countries (Box 3).

Box 4: Cost of corruption in Asia-Pacific.

Afghanistan: The total cost of corruption in Afghanistan has significantly increased over the past three years to $3.9 billion USD. The bribes that Afghan citizens paid in 2012 equals double Afghanistan's domestic revenue. In 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service and nearly 30 per cent of them paid a bribe for a private sector service, (UNODC & Islamic Republic of Afghanistan-High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, 2012). In 2014, corruption ranked equally with unemployment as the second biggest problem for the country after insecurity, according to a bi-annual corruption survey by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2014).

Bangladesh: In 2005, on an average a Bangladeshi pays $US 7 (Taka 485) annually as bribes. In 2008, the annual bribe paid by households in Bangladesh is estimated to be $US 694 million (Taka 54.43 billion). It is estimated that 3.84 per cent of per capita income of an average Bangladeshi citizen is lost due to corruption. In 2010, $US 1.224 billion (Taka 95.926 billion) is lost due to bribery or unauthorized payment (TI Bangladesh, 2010).

Cambodia: In 2005, the direct impact of corruption is 1.4 per cent on household expenditure. This is far less than indirect impacts (The World Bank). In 2006, the private sector paid 2.8 per cent of their annual turnover as bribe money; the government collected only 25 per cent of the tax revenue, the size of unofficial payments ($US 300 million in 2005) is enough to raise the salary of the civil servants to a decent level (Economic Institute of Cambodia & PACT Cambodia, 2006).

India: In 2005, common citizens in India paid bribes of $US 4.85 billion (Rs 210.68 billion) for getting eleven categories of public services. In 2008, the total bribe amount paid by households living below poverty line is estimated to be $US 224.05 million (Rs 8,830 million). In 2010, the total bribes paid is estimated to be $US 101.22 million (Rs 4,718 million) for four categories of public services, namely, PDS, water, health and school (Centre for Media Studies, 2005).

Indonesia: Indonesia Corruption Watch has estimated the total cost of corruption in 2011 to be Rp2.13 trillion ($US 238.6 million) (Sihite, 2012). The four major forms of corruption include: (a) Embezzlement (Rp1.23 trillion), (b) Bogus projects and travel cost (Rp 446.5 billion), (c) Misappropriations (Rp181.1billion) and (d) Mark-ups (Rp171.5 billion).

Mongolia: Based on the data that 13.3 per cent of the total 677.8 thousand households of Mongolia have paid bribe during the last 12 months to public officials and that the average spending for corruption of a household was 240.8 thousand MNT, the total number of the bribe paid by households to public servants reaches 21.7 billion MNT ($US 15.53 million). This sum could have supported 4921 average households of Mongolia for entire year (Independent Authority Against Corruption of Mongolia, 2010).

Pakistan In 2009, the cost of petty bribery in Pakistan is estimated to be $US 2.49 billion (Rs196 billion). In 2010, the cost of petty bribery is estimated to be $US 2.65 billion (Rs223 billion), i.e., an increase of 11.37 per cent from 2009 in rupee terms (TI Pakistan, 2010).

In recent years measuring corruption has been used increasingly to go beyond advocacy and into informing anti-corruption efforts based on actionable data. National survey results have helped to provide better insights into the root causes of corruption, as these were not explained by global data. There is a preference for national corruption measures. This is because most global measures and indexes are based on the perceptions of experts and business people. As such, they do not provide the most accurate, disaggregated and

actionable data. National corruption surveys based on the public's corruption experience[6] can provide information on the severity of the corruption problem by sector, location, and specific target group.

Anti-corruption measurement tools have sometimes been used to support the development and monitoring of anti-corruption policies, whether these are single anti-corruption strategies or other policy frameworks. Here are some examples when measurement tools were used to:

- *Collect benchmark data to develop a baseline on corruption.* This is observed in Bhutan, Afghanistan, India, Maldives, and Timor-Leste. Corruption surveys in Afghanistan have three elements for corruption monitoring: (1) general assessments of corruption as benchmarks and measuring progress; (2) sectoral assessments for more in-depth and specific information to assist in identifying targeted policy measures; and, (3) a system for monitoring state response to corruption, both repressive and preventive measures, in order to identify successful and unsuccessful practices.
- *Identify weak spots in existing laws, institutions and procedures and informing the introduction or the revision of new anti-corruption frameworks.* In Bangladesh, for example, several reform measures were introduced after Transparency International Bangladesh conducted corruption studies. These include the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission, the enactment of the Right to Information Act, the Whistleblowers Act, election law reforms including disclosure by political parties and candidates, reform of the Public Service Commission, submission of wealth statements by judges, and the introduction of an anti-corruption curriculum in schools.
- *Detect corruption prone areas, sectors or institutions.* A key contribution of corruption surveys, integrity assessments, and diagnostic surveys is the detection of corruption-prone areas, sectors, institutions, and even specific activities of government. Samples of corruption-prone areas as revealed by surveys in Asia-Pacific countries are listed in Table 3.

Table 4: Corruption prone areas in Asia-Pacific

Countries	Corruption-Prone Areas
Afghanistan	Corruption is most severe in sectors that are supposed to defend them, i.e., judicial system and interior ministry (Torabi & Delesgues, 2007).
Bangladesh	Judiciary seen as the most corrupt sector, followed by law enforcement, land administration, health, and education (TI Bangladesh, 2010).
Cambodia	Judiciary, customs, business licenses, police, standard inspections and tax authority are notorious for providing poor quality services and requiring largest bribes. Teachers are perceived as the most corrupt people followed by local officials and police (Song et al, 2000).

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6   There are three views related to the "perception vs. experience" debate on corruption measurement. The first view says there is no difference between perception and experience; all experiences also go into the make-up of people's perception. The second view emphasizes the need to differentiate between the two. In situations where corruption experience is high, people may have increased tolerance for corruption. In other cases, because of government's intensification of the anti-corruption drive or due to increased media coverage or due to some recent high profile scams, people's perception of corruption may be high. Hence, there may be a difference in people's perception of corruption and their actual experience. The third view seeks to explain that measuring people's experience with corruption is only good to the extent of understanding petty types of corruption measured in the form of bribery. For understanding grand corruption like policy captures and nepotism one has to rely on perception.

Countries	Corruption-Prone Areas
India	Police stands out high on the corruption score, followed by the judiciary (lower Courts) and land administration. Kerala stands out as the least corrupt state and Bihar to be the most corrupt state in India in 2005 (Centre for Media Studies/TI India, 2005).
Indonesia	Those perceived as the most corrupt include all key institutions of the justice sector (the police, the courts, the public prosecutor, and the Ministry of Justice), key revenue agencies (the customs service and the tax authority), the Ministry of Public Works, Bank of Indonesia, and the Central Bank (Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, 2001).
Mongolia	The opportunities for grand corruption in Mongolia are in two areas, namely, foreign donor assistance and privatization of state-owned enterprises (Casals & Associates, Inc./U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], 2005).
Nepal	Land administration is the most corrupt sector in Nepal followed by the customs department. Police and judiciary were ranked as the third and fourth most corrupt sectors in Nepal (TI, 2002).
Pakistan	The police is seen as the most corrupt sector, followed by power services, land administration, and education (TI Pakistan, 2010).
Maldives	The Parliament is seen to be the most corrupt institution, followed by political parties and the judiciary (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2011).
Thailand	Corruption is very much prevalent in offices that have a role in monetary transactions like land, tax, customs, and the courts. Corruption is a big problem in the police and perceived to be a major problem among politicians (Phongpaichit et al, 2000).

- *Inform the development of anti-corruption strategies as well as monitor their implementation.* For example, Indonesia's 2012–2025 National Strategy for Corruption Prevention and Eradication uses several indicators to build a roadmap of performance targets (Sadiawati, 2013). Indicators include Transparency International's CPI, percentage of compatibility of Indonesian anti-corruption regulations with the UNCAC, a National Integrity Index, a corruption prevention index, the conviction rate in cases handled by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), percentage of asset return based on court verdicts, an anti-corruption behaviour index, and stakeholder satisfaction based on reporting by the KPK.

F. Challenges in using corruption measurement

Corruption measurement practices are not devoid of pitfalls and shortcomings. They might trigger resistance from those that are identified as most corrupt. Certainly, they are only credible to the extent that their methodology is sound and that there is sufficient funding to sustain them over time. This might explain the reason why corruption measurement tools are still too rarely used to inform anti-corruption policies and strategies.

1.   Survey results are not well received

Survey results sometimes can lead to controversy, and raise strong resistance for policy reforms instead of facilitating them. TI Bangladesh, for example, was accused of defaming the country after the publication of its first survey. In 2010, the survey results indicated the judiciary to be the top most corrupt sector. The issue dragged TI Bangladesh into litigation as some disgruntled lawyers filed a case charging TI Bangladesh of defaming the judiciary. Furthermore, TI- Bangladesh had to give up corruption news scanning with increasing public criticism on the methodology. This case may be rather sporadic or based on anecdotal accounts only, but they speak of possible risks associated with corruption surveys.

2. Donor dependency, duplication of efforts and lack of institutionalization

The majority of surveys in developing countries have been possible due to financial and technical support from donor agencies. This has undermined the regularity and frequency in organizing surveys and in using their results. There is also an issue of duplication of surveys in some countries. In some countries (e.g., Afghanistan and Cambodia), similar surveys have been carried out in a single year by two different institutions. The availability of funds and lack of institutional coordination may have led to this situation. Due to donor dependency some countries have not been able to organize surveys on a regular basis. This raises the question of long-term sustainability of surveys. Survey frequency is too often determined by the availability of donor funding.

3. Quality of surveys

Ultimately, the usefulness of survey results depends on their quality. Low capacity on the part of a funding agency to select and monitor the performance of the surveying agencies, low quality of questionnaire, and lack of expertise in data processing—all contribute to low quality survey results and diminished public trust in those results. In Nepal in 2004, a corruption survey had to be abandoned at the stage of data processing because the survey agent lacked the capacity to process and analyse the survey information.

4. Use and impact of survey results

The use of most survey results has been primarily for media reporting. This has helped to sensitize the public and to launch NGO advocacy works. Also, some countries have used survey results to inform policies. In an online survey by the Asia-Pacific Integrity in Action (AP-INTACT) network, some respondents expressed reservations on the extent to which survey results influence policy-making.

Figure 4: Results of online survey with the AP INTACT on corruption measurement practices in Asia-Pacific.strategy

How do you rate the extent to which corruption measurement systems inform anti-corruption policies in your country? (N=62)

| Excellent | Very good | Good | Average | Poor |

Moreover, the extent to which data gathered from surveys feeds into policy reform largely depends on the construct of the survey. If the surveys are designed for a specific purpose such as designing baseline and target indicators for national anti-corruption strategies, data might contribute significantly in influencing policy-making. If the objective of a survey is merely raising awareness by gauging people's perceptions, this might or might not influence policymaking or reforms.

III. Lessons Learned on Anti-Corruption Strategies and their Effectiveness

Despite the diversity of corruption problems and situations in Asia-Pacific this study outlines five lessons learned on anti-corruption strategies that could be applicable to all countries in the region.

A. Lesson One: Political changes provide both an opportunity and a challenge for the sustainability of strategies

The anti-corruption drive in every country reviewed in this study has coincided with political changes that have taken place —from regime change to newly elected governments to relaxation in political freedoms. Political changes provide a window of opportunity to initiate anti-corruption drives. However, it is equally true that political changes also could be detrimental. They could delay, retard or even reverse the course of a country's anti-corruption drive. Politics and corruption problems are highly interlinked. Therefore, the success or failure of an anti-corruption strategy,is very much contingent on the quality of political changes taking place in a given country.

B. Lesson Two: The ultimate value of corruption measurement practice vis-à-vis national anti-corruption strategies rests on its end use by policy makers

How the results of corruption measurement practices are put to use determines their value. In addition to raising awareness about the extent of corruption, national surveys could be more systematically used to inform the development and monitoring of anti-corruption strategies. Also these surveys will only be useful to the extent that they are carried out at regular intervals. Donor support to corruption measurement practices can encourage these practices. However, ad hoc, one-shot corruption perception surveys have little value compared to regular surveys. The ultimate value rests on the sustainability of measurement practices to track progress over time. Those governments that have made corruption measurement a regular practice have managed over time to adjust their anti-corruption policies and strategies based on evidence of results.

C. Lesson Three: Data collection is an integral component of anti-corruption strategy formulation, monitoring and evaluation

There is a missing link between data collection and M&E of national anti-corruption strategies. Activities related to the formulation, implementation, and M&E of an anti-corruption strategy are within the purview of the state. However, in most of the cases, corruption measurement is with non-state actors. Civil society organisations play a key role in corruption measurement in many countries except for a few countries where corruption measurement is undertaken by the government or the anti-corruption agency. Therefore these organisations need to be consulted in the development, monitoring and evaluation of the strategy to help monitor progress over time. If not there will be an inherent flaw in

the collection of corruption information and its proper use for design, implementation, and M&E.

D. Lesson Four: Anti-corruption agencies will only be able to coordinate the implementation of strategies if they are supported by the political level

In almost all the countries reviewed for this study, anti-corruption agencies are at the centre stage of the development and implementation of anti-corruption strategies. In some countries the process of establishing an ACA was deliberately delayed, which had a subsequent impact on the development of the strategy. Where the ACA already existed, it can be stalemated either by the non-appointment of commissioners or by not providing the ACA sufficient resources and mandates.

Even for those countries that have a fully functioning ACA, the role of the agency is often weak given that the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy often rests with numerous agencies within and outside the state and relies on long-term financial commitments. This requires strong support and coordination from the centre, which is often lacking. Without this high-level support the agency will not be able to engage line ministries in the development and implementation of the strategy. Therefore political will to fight corruption is a pre-condition for the successful implementation of the strategy. This entails that the agency should be equipped with sufficient resources, capacity and power to prevent and combat corruption by providing overall coordination while the central government should help steer the overall process of strategy development, implementation, and monitoring.

E. Lesson Five: The monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption strategies remains the weakest link

A key challenge is to identify measurable indicators, with established baselines and tracking mechanisms to determine whether progress is being made and adjust policies and strategies accordingly. Only a few countries have set up adequate implementation, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms. Countries like Malaysia and Republic of Korea need to be studied more closely to understand how their good practices can be replicated in other countries. Performance criteria and indicators are often lacking in the design of an anti-corruption strategy. M&E needs to be integrated more effectively in anti-corruption strategies in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Kuala Lumpur Statement on Anti-Corruption Strategies (see Annex A) presents recommendations that emerged from experiences in developing, implementing and monitoring anti-corruption strategies in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Annex A. Kuala Lumpur Statement on Anti-Corruption Strategies, Malaysia, 21–22 October 2013

On 21–22 October 2013, high-level representatives of anti-corruption authorities as well as national planning authorities from the South, East and Southeast Asia and anti-corruption experts from around the world gathered in Kuala Lumpur at the invitation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in partnership with the Government of Malaysia, to discuss a set of Guidelines for Anti-Corruption Strategies, that could instruct the process of developing, designing and implementing sustainable anti-corruption strategies.

The participants included several officials of anti-corruption authorities, other anticorruption practitioners, and representatives from national planning authorities, and executive, legislative and judiciary branches. Representatives of UNDP, UNODC, the World Bank, the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, Transparency International and U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre also took part in the proceedings.

The participants reviewed and discussed country experiences from around the world, with a particular focus on South, East and Southeast Asia, relating to the process of developing anti-corruption strategies, the design and content of anti-corruption strategies and the monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption strategies.

Recalling the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC),[7] which in its Articles 5 and 6 obliges States Parties, in accordance with the fundamental principles of their legal systems, to develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anticorruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability,

Recognizing that anti-corruption strategies can provide a comprehensive policy framework for actions to be taken by States in combating and preventing corruption, a useful tool for mobilising and coordinating efforts and resources by governments and other stakeholders, for policy development and implementation, and for ensuring monitoring of policy implementation,

Considering that a number of countries in South, East and Southeast Asia have implemented anti-corruption strategies or are in the process of drafting new strategies and revising old ones,

Recognizing that there are a large variety of models and approaches to the development of anti-corruption policies and strategies and common lessons to be learned from experiences in developing these strategies in the region,

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7   General Assembly resolution 58/4, annex.

The participants:

1. *Recommend* the following:

Anti-Corruption Strategy Development Process

-   **POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CONTEXT:** States must take into account their particular political, social, economic and cultural context when designing anti-corruption strategies.
-   **POLITICAL WILL:** Committed political leadership, ideally from the highest levels of the State, and broader political support to steer the overall process and mobilise necessary resources, is a necessary condition of an effective anti-corruption strategy development process.
-   **STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT (INCLUSIVE PROCESS) AND OWNERSHIP:** Broad engagement of stakeholders builds ownership and helps to ensure acceptability and effectiveness of strategies adopted. State institutions (executive, legislative and judiciary) at national and sub-national levels, civil society organizations, private sector, media, professional societies, trade and industry associations and labour unions, academic institutions, youth and cultural organizations, can serve as important allies and partners in the development of anti-corruption strategies and can reduce the vulnerability of the reform efforts to changes in political leadership.
-   **CLEAR AND TRANSPARENT PROCESS:** The process of developing strategies needs to be clear and transparent from the outset.
-   **COMMON VISION:** A consensus should be built around a common vision and intended objectives of strategies.
-   **STRENGTHENING COORDINATION:** Anti-corruption strategies should focus on enhancing inter- and intra-agency coordination during the development process as well as implementation and monitoring phases.
-   **SOUND KNOWLEDGE BASE:** Development, implementation and monitoring of strategies should be informed by sound diagnostics, needs and evidence of risk and vulnerability areas and gaps in anti-corruption policies and institutions.
-   **SUSTAINABILITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PROCESS:** Development of strategies should be institutionalized to ensure continued relevance and timely modification of the anti-corruption strategies.
-   **ALLOCATING AND MOBILISING RESOURCES:** Necessary resources should be mobilised at the time of development of strategies to ensure effective implementation and monitoring of strategies.
-   **PUBLIC COMMUNICATION AND ENGAGEMENT:** Anti-Corruption and National Planning Authorities shall communicate and engage with the public regularly in order to ensure public confidence and channel feedback for the effective implementation of anti-corruption strategies.

Anti-Corruption Design & Content

-   **RATIONALE CORE OBJECTIVES AND REALISTIC GOALS:** Core objectives and goals, and rationale for interventions should be defined based on national priorities, and identified gaps and needs.
-   **NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY/PRIORITIES AND BROADER CONTEXT:** Anticorruption strategies should be incorporated within broader national development initiatives currently in focus and should take into account international/regional obligations.

- **INTEGRATION WITH OTHER RELEVANT NATIONAL PROGRAMMES/REFORM AGENDAS:** Anti-corruption strategies should take into account and establish links with other relevant national strategies (e.g., judicial sector, public administration reform, open government, etc.) and should seek to form synergies with other agencies.
- **COMPREHENSIVE AND COORDINATED APPROACH:** Anti-corruption strategies should be organized under an overarching/holistic approach while taking into account sector specific needs.
- **CLEAR AND UNDERSTANDABLE DOCUMENT:** Strategies have to be clear, concise and easily understood.
- **STRUCTURE AND DESIGN:** While there is no simple formula for the proper design, content or implementation of anti-corruption strategies, UNCAC can be used as a framework for anti-corruption strategies, taking into account relevant data, particular needs, and national capacities.
- **PRIORITIZATION AND SEQUENCING:** Strategies need to be realistic on what is achievable in the short, medium and long term, set clear priorities and sequence actions based on priorities. Strategies could be designed with the aim of enhancing the credibility of leadership and ensuring quick tangible results to strengthen the national commitment to reform.
- **IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM:** It is imperative that strategies provide for an implementation mechanism in the form of an action plan with clearly identified responsibilities and timelines for implementation with focus on results. The agency designated to coordinate implementation of strategies should be within high-level government agencies.
- **SUB-NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION:** Where applicable, particular attention should be paid to strategies' implementation at sub-national and local levels.
- **INSTITUTIONAL & FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY (NEEDS & CAPACITIES):** Strategies should provide for their institutional and financial sustainability and should take into account capacity for implementation.

Anti-Corruption Strategy Monitoring & Evaluation

- **INTEGRAL PART OF STRATEGY DESIGN:** Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are an integral part of national anti-corruption strategies. Elements of evaluation and data collection systems should be built into strategies from the design phase.
- **INDICATORS WITH CLEAR BASELINES AND TARGETS:** Measurable indicators, with established baselines and tracking mechanisms, are needed to determine whether targets are being achieved.
- **NEED FOR DATA GENERATION TOOLS:** Effective monitoring and evaluation requires reliable data that is generated based on multiple sources.
- **REGULAR REPORTING:** Regular monitoring and reporting allows authorities to gauge progress in implementation and achieving results in curbing corruption.
- **EVALUATION V. PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT:** It is important to distinguish between programme management monitoring (activities/outputs) as opposed to evaluation (outcomes/impact) and between implementation responsibilities as opposed to monitoring and oversight responsibilities.
- **RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY:** National body/bodies should be entrusted with the responsibility for monitoring, implementation and regular reporting and be provided with sustainable institutional and financial support. An independent evaluation should ensure accurate monitoring and reporting at regular intervals.

1. Encourage Anti-Corruption and National Planning Authorities to promote these recommendations within their respective agencies, countries and regional/international networks in a time-bound manner.

2. Call upon Anti-Corruption and National Planning Authorities to promote these recommendations in order to assist members of the executive and the legislature and the judiciary, and the public in general, to better understand and support anticorruption strategies in their development, design, and implementation and monitoring.

3. Welcome the commitment of the host country to raise these recommendations at the 5th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the UNCAC and encourage other participating countries to support this initiative.

4. Express appreciation and gratitude to the Government of Malaysia for hosting the Asia Regional Meeting on Anti-Corruption Strategies organized by UNDP and UNODC to reflect on and promote these recommendations for anti-corruption strategies.

Annex B. Corruption surveys in Asia-Pacific

Nineteen countries in Asia-Pacific have conducted some form of national corruption survey (see Table B.1). Global corruption assessment tools (e.g., Global Integrity Index, National Integrity System, Global Corruption Barometer) as well as other surveys conducted by international organisations (e.g. by UNPD, UNODC, World Bank or USAID) are not included because they are externally driven tools.

The results from a sample of recent surveys organized in 13 countries are presented in table B.2. The information is collected primarily from Internet sources and is not exhaustive.

In November 2011, with funding support from the European Union and UNDP, Transparency International launched the Gateway website (http://gateway.transparency.org/), which gives information on corruption and integrity assessment tools used all over the world. The website is a database of assessment/diagnostic tools categorized under 13 sectors. Many tools are global measurements tools, as well as tools that go beyond corruption measurement, such as right to information, transparency, financial integrity, and governance assessment. The wide distribution of tools in Asia-Pacific countries points to the considerable expansion and popularity of the tools. The tools seem to be widely used in countries such as Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Republic of Korea.

Table B.1: Nationally-driven corruption surveys in Asia-Pacific

Country	Year of first survey	Surveying Agency	Frequency of survey
Afghanistan	2006	Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA)	Every two years.
Australia	1993	Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)	Community attitudes surveys conducted periodically since 1993 to measure changes and trends in the community's awareness, perceptions and attitudes to public sector corruption in New South Wales and the ICAC.
Bangladesh	1997	TI Bangladesh (TIB)	Every three years.
Bhutan	2007	Anti-Corruption Commission	Plans to conduct surveys every three year.
Cambodia	1998	PACT Cambodia and Centre for Social Development	No regularity in organizing surveys but Cambodia has rich sources of information (survey of households and survey of business people). Two most recent surveys done in 2005 and 2010.
China (Hong Kong)	1992	ICAC	Annual community wide opinion surveys.
India	2000	Centre for Media Studies (CMS) and TI India.	Every three years. There are several NGOs in India engaged in survey work.

Country	Year of first survey	Surveying Agency	Frequency of survey
Indonesia	2001	TI Indonesia and KPK	TI Indonesia has organized three national surveys (2004, 2006 and 2008) and one regional survey in 2010. KPK, the anti-corruption agency organizes integrity assessments annually.
Mongolia	2006	Sant Maral Foundation and Independent Authority against Corruption of Mongolia	Since 2006, Sant Maral Foundation has organized corruption benchmarking surveys on a bi-annual basis. In 2009, the Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC) of Mongolia developed the Mongolian Corruption Index. The index will be used on a regular basis. The IAAC is legally mandated to organize surveys on a regular basis at two-year intervals.
Nepal	2002	TI Nepal	There is no system in place to measure corruption regularly in Nepal. The measurement depends on the availability of donor support.
Pakistan	2002	TI Pakistan	TI Pakistan regularly organizes surveys; so far, it has organized three (in 2006, 2009, and 2010).
Sri Lanka	2011	TI Sri Lanka	There are no regular corruption perception surveys at the national level but TI Sri Lanka has organized several sectorial surveys.
Maldives	2011	TI Maldives	No track record on regular surveys.
Philippines	1987	Social Weather Station (SWS)	SWS organises quarterly surveys related to different issues, including corruption. Based on the quarterly surveys, SWS also publishes periodic surveys on corruption. Since 2000, SWS has been organizing a Survey of Enterprises regularly. So far it has done ten rounds of surveys; the results of the tenth round were released in September 2012.
PNG	2009	TI PNG	No track record on regular surveys.
Singapore		CPIB	The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) commissions regular public perception surveys.
Timor-Leste	2011	Anti-Corruption Commission	No track record on regular surveys.
Thailand	2000	Chulalongkorn University	No track record on regular surveys.
Vietnam	2005	Internal Affairs Committee, Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry / Centre for Community Support Development Studies	The survey for constructing the Provincial Competitive Index is available from 2005 on a semi-annual basis. From 2009, the Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) has been developed; the indicator includes corruption as one among six dimensions of governance.

Table B.2: Examples of findings from corruption surveys in Asia Pacific

Country	Survey Title	Sample size	Methodology	Overall findings
Afghanistan	Afghanistan Perception and Experience of Corruption: A National Survey 2010 (IWA)	6,500 respondents from 32 provinces.	Interviews with Individual and Households-in relation to experience of corruption in the delivery of public services.	The findings show that corruption threatens the legitimacy of state-building, badly affects state-society relations, feeds frustration and the support for the insurgency; leads to increasing inequality; impedes the rule of law according to Afghan standards; hinders access to basic public services, which impacts on the poor most severely; and has a major negative effect on economic development.
	Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims 2010 and 2012(UNODC)	7,600 respondents from 12 provincial capitals and 1,600 villages	Interviews with Individuals	Corruption is found to be a more severe problem than insecurity and unemployment in Afghanistan.
Australia	Community Attitude to Corruption and to the ICAC 2010	A total of 4042 people contacted, however only 501 individuals (12.4%) responded.	Respondents were contacted through telephones and responses received through emails.	Respondents to the 2009 survey considered corruption in NSW government departments to be a significantly more serious problem than corruption in NSW local councils. Attitudes and perceptions concerning the reporting of corruption are somewhat similar to those observed in 2006. Over 85% of respondents to the 2009 survey indicated they were willing to report serious corruption and over 90% agreed that it is their responsibility to report corruption. Approximately half indicated that something useful would be done if corruption were reported, although roughly two-thirds appear to believe that people who report corruption suffer for it. It appears that public perceptions of the ICAC in 2009 were also reasonably similar to those reported in 2006.
Bangladesh	National Household Survey 2010 on Corruption in Bangladesh	6,000 households comprising of 3,480 rural and 2,520 urban households selected from 300 primary sampling units in 64 districts.	Information collected through a structured questionnaire.	The survey finds that 84.2% of the households of Bangladesh who interacted with one or more of different public and private service sectors or institutions have been victims of corruption. Corruption victimization is reported to be greatest in judiciary (88%) followed by law enforcement agencies (79.7%), land administration (71.2%) and taxation and customs (51.3). The survey estimates an annual loss of 95.926 billion taka ($US 1.224 billion) due to bribery or unauthorized payments. Compared to earlier survey of 2007, some progress has been observed in sectors like education, health, law enforcement, and local government; however, there is an increase in overall extent of corruption.

Country	Survey Title	Sample size	Methodology	Overall findings
Bhutan	Corruption Perception Survey 2007	6,664 respondents from groups like government, public, corporate, private, armed force, students and farmers, etc.	Structured questionnaire. Face-to-face interviews and online survey.	Corruption is prevalent across all levels in all organizations. However, it is perceived to be highest at the mid-level of authority in all organizations. Nepotism and favouritism and misuse of public funds are perceived to be the major forms of corruption in Bhutan. Needs, wants, social demands and obligations, over regulation, etc. are reported to be some major causes of corruption. Personal influence and gratification, in-kind and pecuniary are the prominent means used to obtain public services. In terms of service delivery rankings Ministry of Education ranks as the poorest followed by Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs. Over the last five years, in Bhutan, corruption is perceived to have increased.
Cambodia	Corruption and Cambodian Households 2010	2,031 households from 21 provinces	Computer based Random Sampling and Systematic Linear Sampling Method	High cost of living is still a number one problem in Cambodia but problem of corruption has also moved up with 84% of respondents agreeing it to be a major problem in Cambodia. Women are more exposed to corruption and poor people in rural areas pay higher proportion earning to corruption. Judges/courts, traffic police, custom and police are rated as most corrupt agencies in Cambodia.
India	India Corruption Study 2010 (Seventh round since 2000)	9,960 rural households from 12 states	HHs level Sample Survey of public perception and experience with four public services, namely, public distribution system (PDS), school education, water supply services and hospital services.	Compared to 2005, there is a decline in perception on corruption in public services; rural households' experience of corruption is down by a half, from 56 per cent to 28 per cent. However, there is a rise in service specific experience of corruption. Difference between respondents' perception and experience of corruption in the four public services is narrowing down as compared to 2005. The difference ranges between 20% and 25% points as against 44% to 60% points in 2005. In India, 95% of the households who are asked for bribes end up paying it. This implies grievance redress system to be poor and lack of accountability among the providers of public service providers. The total bribes paid within a year are estimated to be Rs4.72 billion ($US 86.5 million).

Country	Survey Title	Sample size	Methodology	Overall findings
Indonesia	Measuring Corruption in Indonesia: Indonesia Corruption Perception Index 2008 and Bribery Index (3rd survey after 2004 and 2006)	3,841 respondents. From 50 cities. Respondents were divided into three groups, businesspersons, local civil society figures and public officials.	Quantitative Data- Structured Questionnaire	National average CPI for Indonesia was computed as 4.42 with Jogjarkarta city having the highest score of 6.43 and Kupang city having the lowest score of 2.97. Bribery index shows police as the most vulnerable to bribery, followed by Customs and Immigration Office.
Mongolia	Study of Private Perceptions of Corruption (STOPP I), January 2013	Qualitative analysis: 21 companies interviewed about obstacles they encounter during their business operations. Quantitative analysis: 330 companies interviewed..	Qualitative: Non-structured, face-to-face interviews. Quantitative: self-administered questionnaire. All companies randomly selected.	Small and medium businesses suffer more than large businesses from corruption as an obstacle to their business development.The greatest impediments to company development were reported to be: taxes; obtaining, renewing licenses and permissions; and low level of professionalism of public officials. In recent years, public sector corruption has spread to private business. Embezzlement is frequent through auxiliary business entities acquired or created by corrupt public officials. Despite government efforts to address corruption, there was "little knowledge" (44 percent) or "almost no knowledge" (29 percent) of government efforts to combat corruption within the business community. As the business community has rather low expectations about fighting corruption, its involvement in anti-corruption practices is extremely low. Only 12 percent of respondents admitted that they had taken some measures to combat corruption.
Pakistan	National Corruption Perception Survey 2010	5,200 respondents – 1,300 questionnaires filled from 5 cities of each province.	Simple random sampling, face to face interviews.	The survey revealed that police remains the top most corrupt sector in Pakistan. The survey also revealed that the average corruption per household increased from Rs9,428 in 2009 to Rs10,537 in 2010. Based on a population estimation of 169.50 million and with 8 members/house, the cost of petty bribery in Pakistan is estimated to be Rs223 billion. The increase is by 11.37 % compared to Rs196 billion in 2009.

Country	Survey Title	Sample size	Methodology	Overall findings
Papua New Guinea	Rural Peoples' Perceptions of Corruption in Papua New Guinea 2009	4 provinces representing different regions and broadest scale administrative divisions.	80 focus group discussions consisting of 8-10 individuals held in 8 rural villages spread across four provinces. Respondents were asked set questions about five different scenarios, each of which could be perceived as an act of corruption.	Respondents understand corruption as wrongful acts when people misused their office, engaged in illegal activities, acted immorally, and/or engaged in behaviour, which rewarded the individual rather than the community. Respondents expressed leniency with corruption done from a position of social disadvantage. Corruption is caused by competition and the race for profit, loose government systems, aspects of the wantok system, decaying personal morals, and by the causes of social disadvantage – such as poverty and illiteracy. Corruption results in negative outcomes such as lack of services available at the village level, environmental destruction, increased prices of goods and services, a break-down in law and order, worsening poverty and social inequality and social problems (including prostitution, womanising and increased use of homebrew alcohol). However, some respondents believed corruption to have positive outcomes for the poor and marginalised through providing employment, money and other resources.
Philippines	SWS Survey of Enterprises on Corruption 2012	Executives of 826 companies (281 large, 454 small/medium) from seven regions.	Face-to-face interviews with the executives.	Executives seeing "a lot" of corruption in the public sector fell to 42% in 2012 from 64% in 2009, 60% or more in 2000. Of 20 government institutions rated for sincerity in fighting corruption, 17 improved their net sincerity ratings (per cent sincere minus per cent insincere) from 2009 to 2012. Radical improvements were observed in the Office of the President. This was followed by Department of Health and Department of Trade and Industry and Department of Education, Senate and Ombudsman. Regarding prominent corruption cases in court, the majority of executives see the cases as being conducted fairly, but at too slow a pace.

Country	Survey Title	Sample size	Methodology	Overall findings
				The proportion of executives solicited for any of seven types of bribes in the previous year is at a new low level of 48% in 2012, from 60% in 2009 and a high of 71% in 2008. The three top most solicitation rates in 2012 are: Getting local government permits/licenses (30%), Assessment/payment of income taxes (19%). However, the rate of reporting of bribe solicitations remains very low (9%), and the main excuse is still the feeling of futility in doing so. Although executives see less corruption in the private sector than in the public sector, the situation is also serious, and has not improved. The tendency of companies in their own sector to give bribes to win private contracts is more or less unchanged.
Thailand	Corruption in Public Sector in Thailand: Perception and Experience of Households 2000	4,000 households across the nation.	Interviews of household heads	The prevalence of corruption is relatively small in scale and extent in the government offices providing households with utilities and services. However, it is large in offices having a role in monetary transactions including land, tax, customs and the courts. Corruption is perceived to be a big problem in police and amongst politicians.
Timor-Leste	Corruption Perception Survey 2011	1,060 respondents from 13 districts	Face to face interviews	More than a quarter of the respondents indicated they are very satisfied with the overall situation in Timor-Leste and an equal number perceive some or significant progress since independence. Respondents think corruption is far down the list of the most serious problems facing the country, but understand that the issue is serious. Encouragingly, more than half of the interviewees perceive that the government has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption, even though an almost equal number think corruption exists in most government institutions. Indeed, 70.1% of the respondents think corruption can be eliminated or reduced to a certain degree.

Country	Survey Title	Sample size	Methodology	Overall findings
Indonesia	Measuring Corruption in Indonesia: Indonesia Corruption Perception Index 2008 and Bribery Index (3rd survey after 2004 and 2006)	3,841 respondents. From 50 cities. Respondents were divided into three groups, businesspersons, local civil society figures and public officials.	Quantitative Data- Structured Questionnaire	National average CPI for Indonesia was computed as 4.42 with Jogjarkarta city having the highest score of 6.43 and Kupang city having the lowest score of 2.97. Bribery index shows police as the most vulnerable to bribery, followed by Customs and Immigration Office.

Reading Table B.1, one of the prominent features of corruption surveys in Asia-Pacific is that a large number of them were organized by CSOs, possibly with donor support. The national chapters of Transparency International are at the forefront either in organizing or implementing the surveys. This is followed by anti-corruption agencies. Bhutan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Mongolia, Singapore, Republic of Korea, and Timor-Leste are some countries where anti-corruption agencies are mandated by law to carry out regular corruption surveys. China and Bhutan are two countries that rely on services of state agencies like China's National Bureau of Statistics either to organize the survey itself or analyse the data. In the Republic of Korea, the surveys for integrity assessments are always conducted by an outside research agency. This is to ensure independence of survey results.

The corruption perception survey in PNG (2009) used a unique data collection method. To collect information, a series of focus group discussions were held in various rural communities. The perception survey in India (2008) collected the views of the population living below the poverty line on petty corruption in the delivery of specific public services. A later study in India (2012) focused on urban slum dwellers. Successive surveys in Bangladesh have gradually shifted their focus from rural people to urban people. In 2002, 74 per cent of respondents came from villages; the ratio dropped to 40 per cent in 2010. This is done to reflect the concentration of economic activities in the urban areas and, consequently, the prevalence of corruption in urban areas.

Of 19 countries, only twelve have used or plan to use surveys on a regular basis (refer to Table B.1). Most of these surveys in developing countries have been organized through donor supports. Surveys in Afghanistan, Mongolia, Philippines, Pakistan, and Vietnams have been supported by donor agencies. In Nepal, the surveys have remained more or less a one-shot activity to be organized as and when donor funding is made available. In the Philippines, an Enterprise Survey in 2010-2011 was not possible due to lack of funds. The tenth round survey became possible in 2012 with funding support from AusAID. The lists of countries that have made commitments to organize surveys on a regular basis include Bangladesh and Indonesia (every two years) and Bhutan (every three years).

Australia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia lead the region in terms of frequency of national-level surveys. In terms of availability of historical data on corruption measurement, the Philippine is at the front. The data produced by Social Weather Stations is available from 1987. In more recent years, sector specific surveys have emerged. Private sector business people are surveyed to understand the problem of corruption from their perspective. In a way, this complements the global indicator—the Bribe Payers' Index, i.e., understanding corruption from the perspective of suppliers of corruption. Mongolia (Business Survey) and Vietnam (Provincial Competitive Index) are two countries that have regularly organized private sector opinion surveys. The survey of Suppliers' Perception of Corruption in Australia seeks to understand corruption in government procurement in New South Wales[8]. A more recent example comes from the KPMG survey[9] of CEOs in India.

The Youth Integrity Index/Survey is another sector specific measurement tool initiated first in the Republic of Korea and, now, being applied in Bangladesh, India, and Thailand[10].

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8   Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement: Suppliers' Perception of Corruption, ICAC, June 2011,

9   *Survey on Bribery and Corruption: Impact on Economy and Business Environment* 2011, www.kpmg.com/in

10   Youth Integrity Survey in Thailand is reported to have revealed that 70 percent of youths polled agreed that corruption is all right as long as they also benefit from the scourge, *Bangkok Post,* 7 October 2012.

More recent examples come from Vietnam and Fiji[11]. The purpose of these surveys is to understand the minds of the youth; how they view corruption and integrity in their daily lives so that future levels of corruption can be predicted. By reading the minds of the youths, the Republic of Korea seeks to understand the corruption situation 15-20 years down the road. By organizing youth integrity surveys, Vietnam seeks to introduce school-level curricula.

11   Youth Integrity in Vietnam: Piloting Transparency International's Youth Integrity Survey, June 2011

Annex C. Other anti-corruption measurement tools in Asia-Pacific

1. Anti-corruption indices

After corruption surveys, corruption indices are the other popular tool used in measuring corruption in Asia-Pacific. The indices give a precise, often a single figure measuring corruption. The purpose of constructing indices is to measure the extent of corruption between different institutions, sectors or regions of the country. Table C.1 lists eight countries in Asia-Pacific that are found to be using corruption indices. They are called by different names like Governance and Integrity Assessment, Integrity Index, Corruption Index, Performance Index. In Indonesia, the index is categorized into two, namely, Indonesian Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Bribery Index. Indonesian CPI is used to measure the prevalence of corruption in local governance while the Bribery Index is used to measure the extent of corruption in 15 public institutions.

Table C.1: Sample list of corruption indices used in Asia-Pacific

Country	Name of the Index	Sub-components of the Index
Afghanistan	Provincial Integrity Index	(a) amount of bribe paid, (b) number of bribes paid, (c) individual integrity, (e)anti-corruption performance of state officials, and (f) support of the international community for honest officials.
Bhutan	National Integrity Assessment	Perceived Integrity and Potential Integrity
India	Composite Index	Perception, Experience and Estimation of Corruption
Indonesia	Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Bribery Index	Perceived Integrity and Potential Integrity
Korea, Rep.	Comprehensive Integrity	External Integrity and Internal Integrity
Mongolia	Mongolian Corruption Index	Scope of corruption, Forms of Corruption and Causes of Corruption
Taiwan	Government Integrity Index	Input, Process, Output and Impact Integrity
Vietnam	Provincial Competitive Index	Covering business-critical issues like entry costs, compliance costs, land access, informal charges (meaning corruption) and governance qualities on pro-activity, transparency, labour development and legal institutions.
	Public Administration Performance Index	(a) Participation at local level, (b) Transparency, (c) Vertical Accountability, (d) Control of Corruption, (e) Public Administration Procedures, and (f) Public Service Delivery.

All indices use surveys to collect primary data for constructing index or indices. For example, the construction of PAPI indices in Vietnam in 2011 covered a survey of 13,642 randomly selected citizens. Often the methods used for collecting data for indices are similar as for the surveys discussed above. The main difference is that the surveys used to construct indices are carried out primarily with a view to prepare those indices. They are not ends in themselves. The aim is to develop an index.

In the Republic of Korea and in Taiwan, the indices are used for vertical (over a period of time) and horizontal (across different agencies) comparisons. In contrast to some corruption surveys, which only look at perception of corruption, corruption indices or integrity assessments usually focus on people's experience of corruption. They are designed to extract information from the clients of the institutions providing services.

The construction of integrity indexes is mostly done by state-level agencies like anti-corruption agencies. This is because an integrity/corruption index requires commitment, organizational and resource capacity for continuous and regular construction and use. Because of the involvement of state agencies, compared to perception surveys, the construction of indices also entails follow up actions.

Figure 1.6: Integrity Assessment Framework, South Korea

Source: www.aca-forum.org   Figure in parentheses are weights use for the factors

The corruption index was first developed and used by Seoul City in 1999 and since then it become popular both inside and outside Korea[12]. The index was originally designed to assess the level of integrity of the city departments and the autonomous districts. Since 2002, the anti-corruption agency of South Korea (ACRC) has been using the Government and Integrity Assessment Tool every year to assess the level of integrity of public sector organizations. The Integrity Assessment consists of the assessments of External Integrity and Internal Integrity. The External Integrity assessment is carried out on the citizens and public officials who used public service for citizens and other public organizations, diagnoses the level of integrity based on the experience and perception from the perspective of public service users. The Internal Integrity assessment is carried out on the employees or internal customers of public organizations concerned. It gauges the level of integrity in internal affairs such as personnel management and budget execution. The External and Internal Integrity scores are combined to produce a Comprehensive Integrity Index (Figure 1.6). ACRC has

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12   www.aca-forum.org/include/print.jsp

also shared its methodology with several other countries in Asia, notably Bhutan, Indonesia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Bangladesh and Thailand. For example, the National Anti-Corruption Commission in Thailand (NACC) piloted the corruption index to measure the public agencies performance in all levels. This pilot scheme was developed with technical assistance from Korea. The index (ITA; Integrity and Transparency Assessment) is based on both perception and evidence (experience) surveys.

Table C.1 also presents corruption indices with their defining variables. All indices are composite indices comprising different variables. While constructing indices, different weighting factors are used to arrive at a single index. The Integrity Survey in Indonesia is composed of two factors, namely, "expected integrity" and "potential integrity" carrying 70 per cent and 30 per cent weights respectively. The National Integrity Assessment in Bhutan is composed of the same two indicators, namely, "perceived integrity" and "potential integrity" carrying 41 per cent and 59 per cent weights respectively. Though these two indices originated from South Korea, one can see the difference in application of weights. Whereas Indonesia is mainly concerned about current perceived integrity, Bhutan is more preoccupied by integrity in the future or potential integrity.

The Government Integrity Index in Taiwan is comprised of 28 variables categorized under input (4 variables), process (8), output (9), and impact indices (7) carrying weights of 10 per cent, 15 per cent, 20 per cent and 55 per cent respectively. The Composite Index in India consists of 60 per cent weight for experience and 40 per cent for perception.

Vietnam has instituted two primary measures of corruption. First, the Provincial Competitive Index (PCI) is implemented by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the United States Agency for International Development on a semi-annual basis. It includes a corruption component that goes by the label of "informal charges". PCI is constructed primarily from the perspective of businessmen. The index is available from 2005. Second, from 2009, Vietnam has introduced an elaborate system of measuring provincial governance through a Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI). The index is a joint collaboration with the Vietnam Fatherland Front, the Centre for Community Support and Development Studies, the Committee for People's Petitions, and the United Nations Development Programme. The index piloted in three provinces in 2009, extended to 30 provinces in 2010, and covered all 63 provinces by 2011. The index is expected to be published annually from 2012 onwards.

Box C.1: Vietnam Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI)

PAPI systematically measures and monitors the performance of governance and the public administration system at the provincial level in Vietnam. By capturing citizens' experiences of public administration and comparing and ranking provinces, provincial governments will have strong incentives to improve their performance. The index is also expected to empower citizens to raise their voices about their preferences, frustrations and recommendations in terms of public services (including both public administrative as well as public services). PAPI measures six dimensions of governance. The list of these dimensions and the weights they carry includes: (a) Participation at local level (7.29%), (b) Transparency (24.17%), (c) Vertical Accountability (9.40%), (d) Control of Corruption (17.22%), (e) Public Administration Procedures (6.56%), and (f) Public Service Delivery (35.38%). Each of these dimensions comprises several sub-components to measure governance outputs and outcomes from the perspective of an end-user. The Control of Corruption dimension looks into four types of corruption that are experienced and perceived directly by the citizens, these include: (i) petty corruption by public servants; (ii) petty corruption in public service delivery; (iii) nepotism in public sector employment, and (iv) the willingness to fight corruption of provincial authorities. The hierarchy of corruption indicators is presented in Figure 1.7.

Figure 1.7 : Sub-components of Control of Corruption Dimension in PAPI, Vietnam

Source: CECODES, VFF and UNDP(2011). The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI): Measuring citizens' experiences, Hanoi

Introduced in 2009 as a part of exercise in assessing the state of governance (MDG9) in Mongolia in 2005, the Mongolian Corruption Index is a sophisticated indicator that seeks to capture three dimensions of corruption, namely, (a) extent/scope of corruption and its social and economic consequences, (b) forms of corruption and (c) causes or influencing factor for corruption into a single indicator that ranges from -1 to +1. The three dimensions of corruption—extent, forms and causes—can be taken as "length", "breadth" and "depth" measures of corruption. The index is based on the experience and the perception of the public and experts and the collection of factual data on corruption. This is a composition of perception data and objective or factual data. The indicators are developed for 12 sectors and 22 *aimags*/capital in Mongolia.

The construction of the Composite Index in India includes three factors: (a) perception of corruption, (b) experience of corruption, and (c) the estimation of money involved in corruption. The index is used to rank services that are again broadly categorized into need based services like police, judiciary, land, income tax, municipality services and rural financing institution and basic services like education, health, drinking water, electricity and public rations, and states in India. In 2005, based on the composite index, the police (need based service) and the hospital (basic service) turned out to be the most corrupt services. In terms of 20 states sampled for the study, Kerala was ranked as the least corrupt state and Bihar to be the most corrupt state in India[13]. Whereas the index appeared again in a 2008 study, subsequent surveys in 2010 and in 2012 no longer referred to the index due to the limited number of public services covered by those surveys, as well as budgetary constraints at TI India and CMS.

The construction of the Provincial Integrity Index (PII) in Afghanistan is an aggregate indicator of five sub-indicators. These include: (a) amounts of bribes paid, (b) number of bribes paid, (c) individual integrity, (e) anti-corruption performance of state officials, and (f) support of the international community for honest officials. PII is formed taking into account three main concerns. (1) It should include both perception and experience of households in each province. (2) It should bring together both positive and negative elements that prevents or foster corruption in each province. (3) It should look not only at state service but also at how state officials and their international supporters are perceived. Surprisingly, the study report by Integrity Watch Afghanistan does not contain detailed information on PII in the text other than a section on construction methodology and a map of provinces of Afghanistan as per PII given as an annex to the report[14].

A brief review of corruption indices speaks of a wide variety of indices in use. Even when a similar methodology is applied in constructing indices (e.g., the Korean Integrity Assessments), there exist variations in their adaptation to the local context (e.g., in the weighting factors). One distinguishing feature of corruption indices is that they present corruption measurement as a single figure, ratio or a percentage, giving an impression of simplicity, clarity and precision in corruption measurement. However, understanding the methodologies used to construct such indices are often beyond the comprehension of the laymen. This is the major weakness of corruption indices.

2. *Qualitative assessments*

Qualitative assessments are the third most popular tool used to diagnose the corruption problem in Asia-Pacific. Unlike the corruption surveys or corruption indices, these assessments are not necessarily based on numerical data, but more on substantive interviews with key stakeholders and focus groups. The end products are more qualitative reports. These studies provide in-depth understanding of corruption (or anti-corruption measures) in a specific country, sector or institution. They are usually organized to prescribe specific cures for specific problems of corruption.

Qualitative studies of corruption in Asia were driven and popularized by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank Governance and Corruption Assessment studies. The Bank initiated diagnostic studies at a country level or at multi-country level focusing on the views

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13   Transparency International India, *India Corruption Study 2005*.

14   Integrity Watch Afghanistan, *Afghanistan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010.*

of the common citizens, public officials, and business enterprises. For Asia-Pacific, study reports are available for Cambodia, Indonesia, and Thailand[15].

Another variation on these types of reports are USAID and UNDP mission reports. These assessments are primarily done to provide country level anti-corruption technical assistance. USAID corruption assessment reports are available for Cambodia (2004), Mongolia (2005), Afghanistan (2009), and Timor-Leste (2009). UNDP mission reports are usually circulated among national counterparts and partners. They are not always widely publicized, but they are available for Afghanistan, Mongolia, Maldives, and several other countries in the region.

From 2001, TI introduced National Integrity System (NIS) assessments. NIS assessment studies are available for 31 countries in Asia-Pacific[16]; with some countries now having multiple assessments (Nepal 2001, 2004 and 2012; Mongolia 2001 and 2003; and, Sri Lanka 2003 and 2010). Summary of assessments also are available at the regional level for South Asian countries, Pacific Island countries, and East and South East Asian countries[17]. From 2010, TI has standardized NIS assessments studies with a scoring system. The quantification of NIS is expected to provide cross-country comparisons of NIS assessments that hitherto were produced in prose form.

UNCAC Gap Analyses (nowadays, UNCAC Self-Assessments used to produce the final report of UNCAC Implementation Reviews by peer reviewers) done in some countries of Asia-Pacific (e.g., Bangladesh, Indonesia, Bhutan, Mongolia, Laos, and Maldives) also could be taken as an exercise in measuring anti-corruption efforts. They provide insights into the loopholes in the anti-corruption system and hence the opportunities for corruption. They measure the extent to which a country's national anti-corruption laws, regulations, policies, institutions and programs are in compliance with UNCAC and collect information on number of cases prosecuted in relation to different corrupt practices.

Besides country-level studies, there are qualitative diagnostic studies seeking to analyse corruption problems by sector, by location, and by institutions. Triggered primarily by corruption surveys, TI Bangladesh has undertaken several diagnostic studies to understand the nature and extent of corruption problem in specific sectors. These are called "fact finding diagnostic studies". The diagnostic studies are related to understanding corruption problems in *specific sectors* (water, road, gas, forest, power and education), *specific institutions* (airlines, port, election commission, medical college) and in the delivery of *specific services* (passport, pensions, humanitarian assistance)[18]. Vulnerability of Corruption Assessments commissioned by UNDP in Afghanistan is another example of diagnostic studies. Countries like Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, and the Philippines have used diagnostic studies to understand corruption problems in health, forestry, mining, water, and education sectors. Corruption perception surveys on judicial integrity can be also cited as sectorial diagnostic tools (e.g., in Indonesia).

Private sector surveys are another type of corruption assessment tool used to understand the corruption problem from a business perspective. Mongolia (Business Survey) and Vietnam

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15 http://go.worldbank.org/I9X7MQQMG0

16 The countries include: Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Cooks Island, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Kiribati, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Palau, Philippines, PNG, South Korea, Singapore, Solomon Island, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.

17 http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/nis/nis_reports_by_country

18 Refer to http://ti-bangladesh.org/

(Provincial Competitive Index) are two countries that are regularly engaged in organizing private sector opinion surveys. More recent example comes from a KPMG survey[19] of CEOs in India.

Report Card *Surveys,* originally popularized by the Public Affairs Centre (PAC) in Bangalore, India, are now being widely used to measure and understand corruption problems at the local and community levels. Report card surveys are frequently used in Bangladesh to understand corruption problems in sectors like education, health, local government, and land administration. TI Bangladesh has been applying the citizens' report card (CRC) for assessing the level of satisfaction of the public in terms of the content and quality of public services. CRCs are used as key tools of advocacy to reduce corruption and enhance transparency and accountability in the delivery of public service at the grassroots level.

3. News monitoring

TI Bangladesh can be taken as a leading example in news-scan surveys. Based on regular scanning of the newspaper reporting on corruption, TI Bangladesh maintains a corruption database. TI Nepal also maintains news scan surveys but its use is very much limited. TI Bangladesh has recently stopped publishing news-scan surveys as the methodology is being increasingly questioned by the public. The inherent bias of newspapers in publishing corruption news stories is reflected in the database. TI Bangladesh now uses news-scan data only for in-house purposes. The monthly publication of *Corruption Monito*r in Cambodia is another version of news scan. The publication not only collects corruption news from the media but also summarizes them in terms of number of stories per news source, location of the corruption news story, and the key terms used to convey corruption messages. CMS in India is also engaged in producing reports on trends in media coverage of corruption news stories in India[20].

4. Crowdsourcing

"Crowdsourcing" is a relatively new platform to generate corruption data and promote public accountability in several Asia-Pacific countries. The word "crowdsourcing" was coined in a June 2006 article in the online magazine, *Wired.*[21] In the context of this paper, crowdsourcing can be defined as tapping as many people as possible using online (web, blog, social media, e-mail) and other ICT tools (especially mobile phone applications) to spot check the quality of governance and pinpoint corrupt behaviour.

Examples of crowdsourcing in Asia-Pacific to help strengthen anti-corruption efforts include ipaidabribe (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal), Checkmyschool (Philippines), Bribespot (available in Thai, Hindi, Tamil, Urdu, Indonesian, and Javanese languages), Lapor (Indonesia), and Citizen Feedback Model (Pakistan). A World Bank paper has noted the potential of crowdsourcing in anti-corruption work, saying it can help monitor flows of aid and report on poor government performance.[22]

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19   *Survey on Bribery and Corruption: Impact on Economy and Business Environment 2011,* www.kpmg.com/in

20   www.cmsmedialab.org

21   Howe, J. (2006). "The Rise of Crowdsourcing." In *Wired,* issue 14.06.

22   Bott, M., Gigler, B., & Young, G. (2011, Dec. 14). *The Role of Crowdsourcing for Better Governance in Fragile State Contexts.* World Bank Publications.

- *ipaidabribe* (https://www.ipaidabribe.com). Originated in India, this website allows a user to report anonymously on the nature, number, pattern, types, location, frequency and values of actual corrupt acts. Reports provide a snapshot of bribes occurring in a jurisdiction. Anti-corruption advocates use the reports to argue for improving governance systems and procedures and tightening law enforcement and regulation.

- *Bribespot* (http://bribespot.com/). Bribespot is an app that allows a user to see how much corruption is going on around. Using a smartphone (or a website), a user can report locations where bribes are requested/paid, indicate the size of a bribe and area of government affected. Apps are available for both Android phones and Apple iPhones. Reporting is anonymous; the app does not require the sharing of any personal information.

- *Checkmyschool* (http://www.checkmyschool.org/). Checkmyschool works closely with the Philippine Government's Department of Education and other government agencies. Communities use a blend of tools—including website, social media, mobile technology, and community mobilization—to monitor school services, including classroom construction, school facilities, and textbook distribution.

- *Lapor* (https://lapor.ukp.go.id/). Lapor (meaning "report" in Indonesian) is a government portal that citizens use to report improper conduct done by any public service. Managed by the President's Delivery Unit of Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4) in partnership with Open Government Indonesia, Lapor reportedly receives as many as 1,000 reports a day.[23]

- *Citizen Feedback Model* (http://www.punjabmodel.gov.pk/). This project by the Punjab Government uses a very simple but effective model: Whenever a citizen avails of any government service, his or her cell number is recorded and a supervisory officer (or a call agent on his behalf) calls the citizen up to find out if a government worker committed any corruption. If a pattern of corruption is formed, action is taken. The Government of Punjab has scaled-up this project to cover all 36 districts of the province. It is now running in all districts of Punjab in a number of service departments.

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23   Lukman, E. (2013, Oct 21). "Indonesia's anti-corruption website is now getting 1,000 crowdsourced reports every day." In *Bamboo Innovator*.

Annex D. National anti-corruption strategies in 14 Asia-Pacific countries

AFGHANISTAN

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
Strategy and Policy for Anti-Corruption and Admin Reform – (2008)	No specific provision made in the strategy. Mentioned as the mandate of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC).	Weak and non-functioning state institutions due to 30 years of war; opium trade and large inflow of foreign money have trigged corruption in Afghanistan.	The strategy is very broad and ambitious with administrative reform in mind. The strategy is based on the identification of causal factors of corruption and action plans are suggested to counter these causal factors. The strategy also includes sectorial corruptions. Long term and short term measures are suggested in the report.	HOOAC through monthly meetings of High Level Anti-Corruption Commission. HOOAC, Dept. of Strategy and Policy Planning; The Major Crime Task Force, Attorney General's Office, Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (composed of 3 Afghan and 3 international members)	Early in 2008, UNDP designed and proposed a Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) known as the "Hawken and Munck" proposal consisting of 14 indicators designed to assess anti-corruption reforms and actions taken by the government. However, CMS has not been implemented on the ground. HOOAC was established in July 2008 to implement this strategy.
		An ACA, the General Independent Administration of Anti-Corruption (GIAAC) was established in 2004. However the GIAAC was heavily politicized. In 2007 donors drafted a "roadmap for strategy action" to support anti-corruption in Afghanistan. Anti-corruption became a big agenda during the 2009 elections. President Karzai established the High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption to replace GIAAC in 2008.		In Afghanistan there are 54 institutions, i.e., ministries and departments. Each have been assessed in terms of areas vulnerable to corruption and results were presented by top 3 priorities. The HOOAC also oversee the implementation of the anti-corruption action plan of ministries.	

BHUTAN

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
National Anti-Corruption Strategy Framework - (2009)	The National Anti-Corruption Strategy Framework (NACSF) is broad and applies to all arms of the government and sections of society. Preparing plans and implementing them are the the responsibilities of concerned agencies. The implementation Plan contains proposed activities, objectives, expected outputs, time frame and responsible agencies.	Though corruption in Bhutan is low and manageable, there is an increased threat; nepotism and granting of favours are more prevalent than outright bribery,	Focus on seven broad areas: Promote Quality Leadership; Ensure Sustained Political Will; Review Legislative Framework to Make Corruption a High Risk Offence; Review and Strengthen Institutional Capacity; Review and Refine Systems; Develop Long-term Educational Strategy for an Awakened Citizenry; and Promote Partnership with Stakeholders	The Government Secretaries under the body of the Committee of Secretaries (COS) monitors the implementation of the NACSF. Those not falling under specific ministries are monitored by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), e.g., armed forces, autonomous bodies, religious bodies.	Streamlining of anti-corruption campaign in Bhutan. Greater public consciousness on need to fight corruption; quality of complaints received by the ACC have improved; more media coverage of corruption stories. Monitoring indicators are being developed.

CHINA

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
Implementation guideline for building and improving the system to punish and prevent corruption through education, regulations and supervision. (2005)		Post 1978 economic reform in China has been accompanied by spiralling of corruption. China lacks a competitive political processes, an independent judiciary and a free press. The involvement of high-ranking political figures in corrupt activities also exacerbate the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Post reform China has seen the intensification of corruption, i.e., corruption involving big stakes taking place at higher levels.	1) To establish a moral defence line in the mind-set of leaders and the general public through strengthening education on anti-corruption and promoting integrity. 2) To strengthen the construction of anti-corruption and integrity institutions and letting them play a major role in the prevention and punishment of corruption. 3) To strengthen the restraints and supervision of government power and ensure the right application of power. 4) To fully exercise the function of punishment in the prevention of corruption.	Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), Ministry of Supervision and Procuratorate; National Bureau of Corruption Prevention (NBCP)	Corruption prevention strategy has shifted from severe punishment and education to prevention, punishment and education.

INDIA

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
National Anti-Corruption Strategy (Draft) – (2010)	The Strategy recommends a set of action both by the government by political entities, the judiciary, media, citizen groups, and the private sector. To strategy has suitable parameters for monitoring and evaluation. The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) reviews strategy progress on an annual basis and submits a report to Parliament.	Existing anti-corruption interventions are mostly punitive in nature. For integrity to become embedded in public life, it is important that India shifts to a more holistic preventive and participatory approach. Moreover, a tendency has set in where the fight against corruption is seen as the job of a few anti-corruption agencies, whereas in reality it is the responsibility of every citizen and organization. Therefore, a need was felt for a single comprehensive strategy that harmonizes the efforts of stakeholders and sets an agenda for collective action.	The strategy covers: 1) Legal and Regulatory framework for fighting corruption; 2) Mechanisms to address political and administrative corruption; 3) Strengthening institutions to effectively combat corruption; 4) International Cooperation; 5) Role of the private sector in combating corruption; 6) Social Infrastructure for fighting corruption; and, 7) Role of citizens in anti-corruption.	Central Vigilance Commission.	Strategy adopted.

INDONESIA

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
National Action Plan (Ran PK) – (2004–2009)		Corruption in Indonesia is a legacy of the past with reforms initiated after the Suharto regime, including decentralization and efforts to do away with "Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme" (KKN). A wave of corruption swept across the country between 2001 and 2004. The anti-corruption enforcement drive took off in 2004. Several laws and institutions were created. These were followed by enforcement and prevention programmes.	Corruption prevention and enforcement in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and North Sumatra; general preventive measures; general enforcement measures and guidance for monitoring and evaluating implementation. The emphasis was on preventive as against enforcement (and M/E.	Minister of State Administrtration (Men PAN)	Indonesia's anti-corruption driveis regarded as highly successful after 2004, with the success stories of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).
National Strategy in Combating Corruption 2011–2025			Track 1: Strengthening and expediting the current program. Track 2: National Portal on Information Openness. Track 3: Pilot Projects and New Initiatives.	Presidential Delivery Unit (PDU); National Development Planning Agency; Ministry of Communication and Information; and, National Information Commission	

MALAYSIA

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
Fighting Corruption subsumed under Government Transformation Program (GTP).	Three corruption prone areas identified: 1) regulatory and enforcement agencies; 2) government procurement; and, 3) grand corruption (political corruption)			GTP was developed under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, supported by the Chief Secretary and the civil service. The Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU) is responsible for developing national key result areas (NKRA) and monitoring of the same. For anti-corruption, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) is responsible for the NKRA on corruption.	Currently, fighting corruption is at the third phase of implementation

MALDIVES

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
The Anti-Corruption strategy is subsumed within the good governance agenda of the National Framework for Development (2009-2013)		The change in government; drafting of a new constitution.	Combat and reduce the level of corruption; promote a culture of integrity and honesty in the private and public sector, empower institutions to combat corruption and take actions against corrupt people.	The President's Office and the Anti-Corruption Commission	Anti-corruption is a recent activity in Maldives.

MONGOLIA

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
National Program on Combating Corruption (NPCC) — 10-year plan - (2002)	Provisions for monitoring is built into the strategy. Policies include: Regular effective and results oriented monitoring; periodic assessment of legal provisions against corruption; evaluation of the administrative mechanism based on information received through monitoring. The strategy is reviewed and renewed every five years.	Transition from socialist to market economy created opportunities for corruption. UNDP 2-phase support led to development of the NPCC, which focused on creating a new anti-corruption law and an anti-corruption agency.	The NPCC has 3 approaches: prevention, education, and enforcement. It has been instrumental in defining broad philosophies, strategies, and priorities to strengthen the national integrity system.	National Anti-Corruption Council; Independent Authority on Anti-Corruption (IAAC); and, National Statistics Office (NSO).	Under UNDP supported project within MDG9 zero tolerance for corruption, IAAC is responsible for developing index of corruption and monitoring public perception of corruption in politics, judicial and law enforcement agencies. The NSO addresses issues related to the public perception of corruption in public administration and public service delivery.

NEPAL

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
Strategy & Action Plan against Corruption 2008		Nepal's anti-corruption drive coincided with the global anti-corruption movement in the mid 1990s when successive coalition governments saw spiralling trends of corruption. The Maoist conflict also produced a financial crisis requiring the government to adopt austerity measures. New anti-corruption laws were drafted and the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) was empowered. The CIAA started taking high profile actions in 2002-2004, but the royal takeover politicized the anti-corruption drive. Political developments in 2006 retarded the anti-corruption drive as the country was pre-occupied with the drafting of a new constitution and concluding a peace process. Amid political instability and insecurity, including the situation of impunity, corruption is a big problem in Nepal.	The strategy is ambitious. It is designed to combat corruption in multiple fronts like public administration, local governance, private sector, banking and finance, public contracts, political party financing, and public sector management (public enterprises). It opts for zero tolerance of corruption, drafts new laws, and undertakes promotional activities. The action plan consists of 483 activities with a budget of Rs141.95 million.	The Office of the Prime Minister and Council Minister (OPMCM) is primarily responsible for drafting the anti-corruption strategy but inputs were sought from the CIAA and civil society organizations. The action plan was drafted within four months. The action plan was prepared by the concerned line ministries and institutions.	Nepal ratified UNCAC in February 2011. The new government in September 2011 opted for a "zero tolerance" policy on corruption.

PAKISTAN

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NAC) - (2002)	A clearcut Implementation Action Plan is worked out in the anti-corruption strategy.	Inherited the 1947 Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA). WWII led to an immense increase in procurement related corruption. A special police corruption agency under the PCA. Promulgation of the 1949 Representatives (Disqualification) Act and the 1959 Elected Bodies (Disqualification) Ordinance. However, these failed because they were perceived as tools of political victimization. A special committee for the eradication of corruption was set up in 1961.	Explicit, Holistic Approach-Awareness/Prevention/Enforcement; National Integrity System (NIS) pillars; Legal provisions. This is considered an overall strategy	The National Anti-Corruption Strategy Project team conceived by the NAB.	The Accountability Act violates UNCAC, which Pakistan ratified in 2007 by deleting the key pillars of anti-corruption, i.e., Awareness and Prevention. Pakistan joined anti corruption initiatives like ADB/OECD Anti Corruption Initiative, Asia-Pacific Group on money laundering (APGML), and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).
		Another attempt in 1987 through a committee for the study of corruption. The Ehesab Bureau in 1997 –augmented the Ehesab Commission of 1996 by giving it the power of prosecution. In 1999 the National Accountability Ordinance was enacted, leading to the creation of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) in 2002. NAB is a supreme anti-corruption agency of the Federal government with a good track record.			Sporadic success.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2010–2030		Corruption is worsening and government institutions appear to be tolerant and passive.	Eight key action areas identified for fighting corruption in PNG.	Government Anti-Corruption Working Group led by officials from the Office of the Prime Minister	Early stage of implementation

PHILIPPINES

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
Ombudsman's 8- Point Comprehensive National Anti-Corruption Strategy	1. Punitive and Retributive Method of Combating Corruption and Aggressive Imposition of Administrative Sanctions. 2. Speedy and Aggressive Investigation and Prosecution of Graft Cases. 3. Efficient and Responsive Public Assistance Program. 4. Intensive Graftwatch Over the Bureaucracy. 5. People Empowerment. 6. Education and Transformation of Individual Psyche through Values Orientation Seminars. 7. Linkages with other Government Institutions and International Corruption Fighters. 8. Systems and Procedures Improvement.	The bureaucracy, which was highly efficient during the American colonial period, became corrupt after the country won independence.	Punitive component. Corruption prevention. The guiding principle of the approach is that an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of prosecution.	Office of the Ombudsman	

THAILAND

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
National Anti Corruption Strategy	1) Establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy Committee. 2) Coordinate Cooperation with the Public Sector. 3) Coordinate Cooperation with the Private Sector and Civil Society. 4) Coordinate Cooperation with the Political Sector. 5) Monitoring and Evaluation of Performance Mobilization	Before 1975 the intensity of corruption in Thailand was obvious. The awareness of corruption began to show up in Government policies. In addition, the Thai Constitution (B.E. 2517 (1974) Section 66) stated that "The State should organize government service works and other works efficiently and should take all steps to prevent and suppress the quest for benefits by corruption means."	Explicit, overall strategy; investigation; prevention and promotion; raise awareness; mobilize all sectors on anti-corruption; strengthen anti-corruption agencies; professionalize anti-corruption personnel	National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC).	National Anti-Corruption Strategy. The working group organized academic seminars to listen to the views and opinions of experts, academics and representatives of government agencies, State enterprises, the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and independent organizations.
		The Counter Corruption Act was promulgated in 1975 and allowed the establishment of the Office of the Commission of Counter Corruption (OCC). However, because of the limitation in jurisdiction, the OCC had little power to combat corruption.			Additionally, the working group invited the general public to submit their views at organized forums. These views were then summarized by the working group and used as data for drafting the National Anti-Corruption Strategy.
		Followed the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997) the Organic Law on Counter Corruption B.E. 2542 (1999) was enacted. In this connection, the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) as an independent Commission was appointed in April 1999.			The working group synthesized these views and proposals and used strategic planning to draft a realistic National Anti-Corruption Strategy.

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
	However, the National Counter Corruption Commission has its resolution 40/2551 on 15 July B.E. 2551 (2008) to change the official names of National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) and Office of the National Counter Corruption Commission (ONCC) to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) and Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (ONAC) respectively.	After 2001, the pattern of corruption in Thailand changed. The appointment of relatives/friends into high level positions became more prevalent. Laws and regulations also were amended to suit vested needs and interests.			Several meeting, brainstorming sessions, seminars, in-depth interviews, SWOT analysis, public hearings were conducted with various stakeholder groups.

VIETNAM

Name of Anti-Corruption Strategy	Provisions in Anti-Corruption strategy	Context	Contents/Focus	Primary institutions responsible	Consequences/Impact
Strategy for Preventing Corruption and Enhancing Effectiveness in Preventing and Combating Corruption in Vietnam towards 2020.		Spiralling of corruption post economic liberalization (doi moi) in 1986 threatened the legitimacy of the one-party regime. The also was international pressure and need to attract foreign direct investments (FDI).	Focus on prevention.	National Anti-Corruption Steering Committee	

Annex E. National anti-corruption strategy vision, mission, and objectives in 10 Asia–Pacific Countries

Country	Vision	Mission	Objectives	Priority areas
Bhutan	It is the responsibility of every Bhutanese to act against corruption in our nation.		Promote public education Ensure transparency and accountability, and the uniform application of laws	7-prong strategy: • Promote Quality Leadership; • Ensure Sustained Political Will; • Review Legislative Framework to Make Corruption a High Risk Offence; • Review and Strengthen institutional Capacity; • Review and Refine Systems; • Develop Long-term Educational Strategy for an Awakened Citizenry; and • Promote Partnership with Stakeholders
India	A nation built on good governance, transparency and integrity, and free from all forms of corruption, and a responsible society aware of its ethical responsibilities.	To channelize, integrate the resources and build synergy into the efforts of all stakeholders in society to promote integrity in governance and progressively eliminate corruption from India through effective prevention, detection and punishment of all corrupt activities.	• Raise public awareness to promote zero tolerance towards corruption; • Undertake effective preventive measures to minimize the scope for corruption; • Strengthen legal and regulatory framework and capacity building of the institutions of accountability as well as enforcement agencies; • Create sustainable deterrence against corruption by strict and prompt enforcement of anti-corruption laws and regulations; • Enhance collaboration amongst all stakeholders in ensuring that corruption cases are detected, reported, and prosecuted properly; • Reduce opportunities of investment and utilization of wealth earned through corrupt means.	• Legal framework • Regulatory framework • Strategy to address political and administrative corruptions • Strengthening institutions to combat corruption • International cooperation • The Role of the private sector • Social Infrastructures to fight corruption (media, education) • Role of citizens in anti-corruption

Country	Vision	Mission	Objectives	Priority areas
Malaysia	• To make Malaysia an Integrity Country, transparent and free from corruption. • To win the confidence of the public, the international community and foreign investors in the transparency and integrity of government service delivery.	• To be the leading organization in the implementation of identified initiatives to increase integrity and transparency in decision making as well as in the implementation of government's projects. • To increase the public's and international community's confidence in the transparency and integrity of government service delivery.	• Reduce corruption crime through enforcement and compliance; • Strengthen transparency to increase Corruption Perception Index score; and • To increase public's perception towards government and public service	3 priority areas for interventions (and nine initiatives). • Regain public confidence in regulatory and enforcement agencies (one initiative) • Reduce leakages in government procurement (two initiatives) • Tackle grand corruption (six initiatives)
Maldives			• Combat and reduce the level of corruption • Promote a culture of integrity and honesty within the public and private sector • Protect society from the effects of corruption and restore the rights of those affected by it, • Empower the relevant institutions, society and the general public to combat corruption, • Pursue those who commit acts of corruption	3 Strategic entry points: • Make Maldives a country free from bribery and similar corrupt practices, • Encourage the ACC to function as an independent institution that strives to realize its mandate and exercise its responsibilities, • Establish and implement preventive anti-corruption practices and procedures
Mongolia	The goals are: • To create conditions for fighting corruption in Mongolia • To create Zero Tolerance for corruption in society, • To foster cooperation between the State, Civil Society, and the Private Sector to prevent corruption and eliminate the causes and conditions of its existence.		• Create new legal environment connected with fighting corruption and prevention, and ensure implementation of these legislations; • Enhance the institutional structures assigned with issues of combating corruption; • Increase general public oversight with the active participation and support of mass media, NGOs and citizens, and provide to citizens, information with regards to consequences of corruption; • Accelerate the reform of all levels of state authorities with legislative, executive and judicial powers; • Improve social security of civil servants; • Cooperate with international organizations and foreign countries.	• Electoral system reform • Legal environment for preventing corruption • Enhancing the Civil Service • Independence of Judiciary • Actions to be taken by the Executive • Liberalization of the economy • Increasing civil society participation in combating corruption • Management and organizational issues related to NPCC implementation

Country	Vision	Mission	Objectives	Priority areas
Nepal	To build a well-cultured and prosperous Nepal through good governance and corruption-free governance system.		• To ensure delivery of quality service through a simplified and ethical approach in governance; • To use time-relevant technology; • To promote an ethical and well-cultured Nepalese society by controlling all forms of corruption-oriented activities.	13 strategic entry points: • Improvement of Legal Framework • Promotional campaign • Improvement of public works • Use of innovative tools in administration • Foreign aid management • Change of social behaviour • Neutrality of public management • Transparency in political parties • Financial sector reform and financial discipline • Transparency and efficiency of local institutions • Enforcement of anti corruption law • Corporate governance in private sector • Monitoring mechanism
Pakistan	A stable Pakistan that is prosperous and has self-sustaining integrity mechanisms by which corruption is eliminated.		• The long-term objective is to eliminate corruption by engaging all stakeholders in the fight against corruption, through a program which is holistic, inclusive and progressive. • The short-term objective is to set in motion systemic improvements that will strengthen the national integrity system and the people against corruption. • The immediate objective is to assist the new political dispensation • inculcating a high set of public standards, publicly declared and verifiable, which will contribute to the attainment of good governance	• *Prevention* – systemic, institutional, legislative, administrative reforms and public education and awareness raising, aimed at building democracy and a strong civil society, and an early and effective removal of incentives/compelling factors and opportunities for corrupt practices, also increasing the risk/ deterrent effect; • *Monitoring* – the regular and systematic measuring of the nature, causes and extent of corruption through reliable and verifiable data collection, analysis and co-ordination; • *Combating* – improvement in the legal and institutional arrangements for the detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption. • The emphasis on the combination of prevention, monitoring and combating marks a departure from reliance only on enforcement approach and is the key to successfully tackling corruption.

Country	Vision	Mission	Objectives	Priority areas
Papua New Guinea	Establish a self-sustaining national system of integrity in which corruption is eliminated and the principles of honesty and ethical conduct, effective application of the rule of law, fair play and openness and accountability are established and practiced in PNG	Provide direction and impetus for a focused and unified national action against corruption at all levels and sectors in PNG	*Long term goals:* • Improve and intensify national efforts to tackle corruption through focused and collaborative actions across all sections of the PNG community involving all actors, including state actors, non-state actors, CSOs, and individual citizens, • Strengthen democracy and public accountability and the integrity and operational and management capacity of state and public institutions, • Strengthen the integrity and operability of private sector institutions and commercial entities • Build a strong civil society that rejects, exposes and fights corruption • Build and strengthen public trust and confidence in their government state institutions, and the private sector and • Build and strengthen the international community's confidence in PNG, its government and people.	8 strategic entry points: • Promote and strengthen honest leadership • Strengthen transparency and public exposure of corruption • Build and maintain effective people management, • Strengthen the integrity of the PFM • Strengthen accountability and oversight • Strengthen compliance and enforcement • Strengthen public awareness and education • Strengthen coordination and partnership
Thailand	A society founded on discipline, integrity, and ethics with all sectors participating in prevention and suppression of corruption.	• Promote and inculcate awareness of a society founded on discipline, integrity and ethics • Create sustainable, integrated anti-corruption networks • Develop systems and mechanisms for the inspection, control, decentralization and check and balance of authority • Promote and support anti-corruption knowledge-management	• Discipline, integrity and ethics in Thai society • Networks comprised of all sectors participating in anti-corruption • Efficient systems and mechanisms for the inspection, control, decentralization, and check and balance of authority • Social anti-corruption awareness	4 strategic entry points: • Inculcate awareness, values, integrity, ethics and discipline in all sectors • Mobilize all sectors on anti-corruption • Strengthen anti–corruption agencies • Develop professional anti-corruption personnel

Country	Vision	Mission	Objectives	Priority areas
Vietnam	As conceived in the Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of Vietnam towards 2010 with a vision to 2020.		*General Objective:* To prevent and gradually eliminate corruption as well as chances for corruption to develop a healthy and efficient government with ethical and incorruptible civil servants, develop sound social relationships through the synchronized implementation of solutions for preventing, detecting and dealing with corruption; strengthen the public and international confidence as well as promoting socio-economic growth. *Specific Objectives:* • To prevent and eliminate corruption in policy making and legislation; • To strengthen inspection and supervision over the exercise of state power; • To improve legal framework for competitive and transparent business environment; • To increase operational efficiency of agencies and units established to discover and punish corrupt behaviours; • To enhance public awareness and role on anti-corruption.	5 strategic entry points: • Enhance publicity and transparency in policymaking, law making and implementation. • Improve the civil service and public servants mechanism and public service delivery quality • Improvement of economic management mechanism and establishment of a competitive environment with equality and transparency • Enhance effectiveness and efficiency of inspections, examinations, supervisions, audits, investigations, prosecutions and judgment in detecting and dealing with corruption. • Enhance public awareness and role in anti-corruption.

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